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Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference:
Judicial Review of

State Regulatory Inaction
Jim Rossi

ABSTRACT: Courts struggle with the tension between nationalcompetition
laws, on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the otherespecially as traditional governmental functions are privatized and as
economic regulation advances beyond its traditionalrole to address market
monitoring. This Article defends a process-based account of the antitrust
state-action exception against alternative interpretations, such as the
substantive efficiency-preemption approach that Richard Squire recently
advanced, and it elaborates on what such a process-based account would
entailforcourts addressingthe role of state economic regulationas a defense
in antitrust cases. It recasts the debate as focused around delegation issues
and judicial deference to regulation-traditionallyissues of administrative
law. Courts frequently invoke antitrust state-action-exception issues where
state officials fail to act or only act partially to regulate, as is increasingly
common where states privatize governmental functions or attempt to
deregulate, or implement competition policies of their own. As this Article
argues, in such contexts a delegation model, which focuses on the conditions
under which state legislative bodies have made delegations, whether agency
regulators have standards, and the reasons provided by state and local
officials for regulatory inaction, provides a more powerful and principled
approachfor evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust
litigation than alternativeapproaches.
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ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

In adopting federal antitrust statutes, Congress has consistently failed to
address how national competition rules will coexist with state or local
regulation. Recognizing that Congress could not have intended blanket
preemption of state or local regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court created an
antitrust "state-action exception," which exempts anticompetitive state
regulations from antitrust enforcement. The exception originated in Parker
v. Brown,I a 1943 case rejecting a Sherman Act challenge to a California
raisin-producer marketing program that a grower brought because the
program derived "its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
of the state."2 Over recent decades, courts have routinely invoked the stateaction exception to reject federal antitrust claims-so much so that in early
2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission included, among its initial
recommendations, a finding that lower courts have interpreted the defense
far too broadly,4 echoing an earlier conclusion by the Federal Trade
Commission.5
While Parker was born of an "era of exceptional confidence in
government,, 6 commentators' skepticism about regulation and the process
from which it evolves has grown. For example, public-choice theory
highlights how the incentives surrounding the lawmaking process diverge
from the public interest when state and local regulations are at issue.'
Recognizing these concerns, the modern doctrinal test for the antitrust
state-action exception, derived from California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
1.

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

2.
Id. at 350.
3.
See infra notes 92-137 and accompanying text (describing cases from the Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); infra notes 44-53, 260-61 and accompanying text (describing
U.S. Supreme Court missteps).
4.
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM., TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 20 (2007),
available
at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/list of-recommendationsjan-I lv3.pdf
(concluding that "federal lower courts in some cases have misinterpreted or misapplied the
state-action doctrine to override the federal policy in favor of free-market competition in ways
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court rulings"). Congress created the Antitrust Modernization
Commission in 2002 to study the need for, and to submit proposals to, modernize federal
antitrust law. 21st Century Department ofJustice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1856 (2002).
5.
A 2003 Federal Trade Commission report concluded that courts have relied too
heavily on the doctrine and that "the state-action doctrine has come to pose a serious
impediment to achieving national competition policy goals." TODDJ. ZYwICKI, FTC OFFICE OF
POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 25 (2003) [hereinafter FTC STATE
ACTION REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
6. John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FfC and State Action: Evolving Views on the
ProperRole of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1075 (2005).
7.
For further discussion, see infra text accompanying note 58 (discussing how, as
Madison recognized in Federalist No. 10, concerns with interest-group exploitation are
heightened as the lawmaking process becomes more local).
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Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,s places its primary focus on the delegation issue faced
by a state legislature in adopting a regulatory program. First, a court asks
whether a state's sovereign lawmaking body (i.e., a legislature) has clearly
articulated a policy to allow the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Second, a
court asks whether the government entity to which authority has been
delegated actively supervises the private conduct at issue. 9
While delegation concerns seem central to the basic state-action
doctrine the Court expressed in Midcal, attention to delegation issues is
largely foreign to the predominant judicial applications of the doctrine as
well as to academic accounts. Instead, the predominant accounts of the
antitrust state-action exception ground its purposes in federalism (or
preemption based on substantive economic efficiency)-a view that Frank
Easterbrook 1° and, more recently, Richard Squire" have advanced-or on a
more policy-oriented balance between markets and regulation-a view
advocated by scholars such as Daniel Gifford. 12 In contrast, Einer Elhauge
has proposed to understand the antitrust state-action exception through a
political "process-based" lens-an account that has much abstract appeal but
practical wisdom for courts in the fifteen years
has not resulted in useful,
3
articulation.'
its
since
This Article urges a fundamental reorientation of the state-action
doctrine in antitrust law. I defend a process-based account of the state-action
exception against alternative interpretations such as the federalism
approach that commentators like Squire have recently advanced. I then
elaborate on what such a process-based account would entail for courts
addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust
cases. In doing so, I refocus the debate around delegation issues and judicial
deference to regulation-traditionally issues of administrative law. State

8. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
9. Id.
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23,
50 (1983) (emphasizing federalism aspects of the antitrust state-action exception).
Richard Squire argues that federal preemption principles should entirely "replace" the
11.
state-action exception in antitrust law. Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59
STAN. L. REv. 77, 79 (2006) (proposing to frame the state-action exception entirely in federal
preemption terms).
12. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism,Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman
Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-MarketPolicy, 44 EMoRY L.J. 1227 (1995) (placing the
antitrust emphasis on striking the balance between markets and regulation). Increasingly,
antitrust law and regulation are converging to present new doctrinal challenges for courts. See
Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 745, 748 (2004) ("[A]s economic regulation
has evolved it no longer makes sense to treat antitrust and regulation as separate bodies of
doctrine-unified, they should form the building blocks of a new competition law.").
13. Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 667, 696 (1991)
("[T]he Court should recognize the process view that actually underlies its doctrine and, if it is
going to decide cases based on that view, explicitly incorporate it into a rule of decision that
better explains and fits its case law.").
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officials invoke antitrust state-action-exception issues when they fail to act or
only act partially to regulate (as is increasingly common where states
privatize governmental functions), implement industry-wide settlements (as
in the context of the tobacco industry), or attempt to implement
competition policies of their own (what commentators refer to as
"deregulation"). 4 As I shall argue, in such contexts a delegation modelwhich focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have
made delegations, whether regulators have standards, and the reasons that
state and local officials provide for regulatory inaction-provides a more
powerful and principled approach for evaluating the interaction between
regulation and antitrust litigation than alternative approaches. A federal
court, in making a decision to extend the state-action exception, is allowing
a state legislature to delegate to state regulators the discretion to opt out of
federal antitrust laws. Of course, courts are willing to allow federal agencies
to exercise discretion pursuant to broad legislative delegations, but typically
only when subject to judicial review for reasonableness. By analogy, it is
entirely appropriate, and normatively desirable, for a federal court to
impose a similar condition on state legislative delegations to a state agency,
subjecting these to arbitrary and capricious review prior to suspending
national competition laws.
The process-based approach to this question leaves room for federal
courts to defer to traditional state regulatory schemes such as cost-of-service
regulation. It also challenges courts confronted with new regulatory
approaches to develop a more nuanced approach to deciding the extent to
which federal law-in particular, the Sherman Act-preempts state
regulation. 15 A process-based account of the state-action exception
recognizes federalism and efficiency as important values, but it changes the
primary emphasis of the judicial inquiry. Applications of the state-action
exception may advance federalism and economic efficiency, but that does
not require courts to ground their decisions in individual cases entirely on
federal preemption or efficiency. In a process-based account, state and local
political processes could advance federalism goals as much as federal courts

14. See infra notes 264-69 (discussing tobacco settlement); infta notes 114-17 and
accompanying text (discussing deregulation policies).
15. For the general argument that the issue of the state-action exception under the
antitrust laws is a type of federal-preemption inquiry, see generally Squire, supra note 11.
Squire's argument understands the assessment of articulated and unarticulated substantive
regulatory goals at the state level and their conflict with federal antitrust-law goals as the basis
for the judicial decision to extend an antitrust state-action exemption. However, consistent with
the Supreme Court's application of Chevron to federal agencies, this Article's approach focuses
primarily on state regulators' processes and pre-articulated reasons for their decisions, not their
substantive regulatory goals as determined by federal courts. Further, this Article's approach
does not propose to replace the state-action exception with a federal-preemption inquiry, but to
refine its application. Thus, to the extent this Article's approach is preemption-oriented, it is a

process-based preemption approach.
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by attempting to identify and apply the substantive values in broad federal
statutes such as the Sherman Act. 16 By discouraging courts from directly
addressing economic-efficiency concerns before addressing the merits of an
antitrust violation, a process-based approach promotes judicial economy
and, if properly cabined, can also have a positive effect on the behavior of
private groups in the lawmaking process.
At its core, the antitrust state-action exception focuses on the conditions
under which it is appropriate for federal courts to defer to state regulatorsa kind of vertical deference in antitrust law. However, antitrust law and
scholarship ignore that administrative law has its own well-settled approach
to determine when it is appropriate for a federal court to defer to federal
regulators-a type of horizontal deference. The Chevron 7 test provides the
predominant paradigm for federal courts reviewing matters of agency
statutory interpretation. When applying the Chevron test, a court will typically
engage in a two-part inquiry: first; it asks whether the statute clearly and
unambiguously resolves the issue in question; second, to the extent the
court deems the statute unclear or ambiguous, it typically defers to an
agency's reasonable interpretation. 8 In contrast to Midca's approach to the
antitrust state-action doctrine, a court addressing deference issues under
Chevron does not always get to the second inquiry. However, where a statute
to an agency's
is ambiguous, the Chevron step two inquiry-deference
'9
reasoned interpretation-is generally appropriate.
While an appeal to Chevron deference alone provides an unsatisfactory
(and, in my view, impoverished) way of thinking about vertical deference
issues in antitrust law,20 an emphasis on delegation issues at Chevron's step
two, and especially the presence of standards to constrain and guide the

16. There is substantial evidence that the drafters of the Sherman Act, who were willing to
allow many inefficient state and local regulations to stand, simply did not have powerful
substantive definitions of efficiency in mind as a basis for preempting state or local regulation.
See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18. Id. at 842-43.
19. Id.
20. There are, for example, those who argue from both the left and the right that strong
deference at step two of Chevron recognizes the constitutional values of the unitary executive.
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing

that delegation

to agency officials authorizes

the President

to manage

executive

interpretations); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
978 n.44 (1992) ("Chevron's democratic theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive,
i.e., an interpretation of separation of powers that would place all entities engaged in the
execution of the law-including the so-called independent regulatory agencies-under
Presidential control."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 333-35 (1994) (arguing that the unitary executive approach to
Chevron, which would entitle the President's interpretation of laws to the greatest deference, is
the better interpretation).
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exercise of discretion, provides a particularly powerful set of guideposts for
addressing state-action-exception cases.2
First, a process-based approach to state-action doctrine helps courts to
focus on the core process questions at issue in evaluating whether a state
legislative body has a clearly articulated policy in making the delegation, if
any. As this Article argues, Midcals clear-articulation requirement, like step
one of Chevron, can be framed as a type of penalty default rule designed to
promote clarity in lawmaking and to deter interest groups from promoting,
and lawmakers from adopting, ambiguous laws that purport to make
excessively broad delegations to regulators. A process-based approach to
state-action doctrine cautions federal courts against aggressively attributing
purposes to state and local legislative delegations, particularly to the extent
this encourages adverse levels of interest-group lobbying in the state
legislative process as a way of opting out of federal antitrust enforcement.
Second, a process-based approach to state-action doctrine replaces a
court's evaluation of state-regulator supervision (the second prong of
Midcal) with an evaluation of the reasons given by regulators. The core
prescriptive recommendation is to focus on the nature and sufficiency of the
reasons the regulator gives (akin to arbitrary and capricious review under
Chevron step two). Unlike judicial application of Chevron step-two deference
in reviewing a federal agency, however, I argue that where there is a state
legislative delegation to an agency in the antitrust context, a court should
always apply something more than mere deference and should review the
regulator's decisions for transparency, consistency, and pre-articulated
criteria. Given the specific interest-group pathologies at issue in state and
local political processes, and especially those processes that large regulated
firms are likely to exploit, the state-action exception presents a more serious
type of institutional problem than judicial review of the run-of-the-mill
federal agency.2 '

21. For a discussion of the delegation-based approach to Chevron, see Lisa Schultz
Bressman, DiscipliningDelegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
452, 483 (2002) (suggesting that there are strong public-choice rationales for requiring
administrative standards in arbitrary and capricious review to address delegation-oriented
concerns). For additional discussion, see Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to
Administer the Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 263 (2006) (arguing that Chevron deference only
extends to specifically assigned agency delegations, not to general delegations to the executive
branch); and see also Evan Criddle, Fiduciary Foundationof Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117, 152 (2006) (arguing that, like corporate law's emphasis on fiduciary duties, administrative
law, including Chevron, "calls upon courts to enforce agency duties in order to promote fidelity
to agencies' statutorily defined missions and the best interests of their beneficiaries").
22. Phil Weiser has suggested that federal courts should apply Chevron deference to the
decisions of state regulators when applying the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Philip J.
Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(1999). Weiser's analysis focuses on the extent to which federal courts should defer to a state
regulator's decision regarding the meaning of federal law. By contrast, this Article focuses on
the extent to which federal courts should defer to state regulators when applying state law
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the problems with
current formulations and applications of the antitrust state-action exception,
which no one finds satisfactory. Traditional approaches, such as a federal
preemption-oriented understanding of the state-action doctrine, have
serious limitations given a state and local regulatory environment that is
increasingly characterized by regulatory transition and inaction. Part II
introduces Chevron,23 the predominant paradigm for judicial review of
regulation in administrative law, highlighting its delegation structure and
aspects of it that are useful in understanding the problems that state
regulation presents for antitrust law. Part III explains the limits to the
analogy between Chevron's first step and the clear-articulation requirement
for antitrust state action. Part IV draws an analogy to step two of Chevron and
analyzes the implications of recasting the antitrust state-action exception to
focus on agency reasons, not power or history. The Article concludes by
elaborating on the kinds of reasons that state or local regulators would need
to provide prior to a court's extension of the antitrust state-action exception
to cases where a regulator bans competition outright, where regulatory
intervention is intermittent (such as in the context of market-based rates),
or where regulation focuses on disclosure and monitoring. I conclude that
emphasizing such accountability in the antitrust state-action exception
context is not only desirable, but it is consistent with the broader goals of
antitrust law and superior to alternative approaches.
I.

ANTITRUST FEDERALISM AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE TO
STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION

Congress clearly has the power to preempt state regulation by adopting
national competition-policy laws, such as the Sherman Act. However, in first
25
recognizing the antitrust state-action exception24 in Parker v. Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress had failed to preempt
state law:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
against the backdrop of the Sherman Act. As suggested below, whatever lessons one takes from
Chevron in the context of the antitrust state-action exception, strong deference to state
regulators should not be primary.
23. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. Although a number of courts and commentators refer to "state action immunity" or
the "state action exemption," this Article eschews these labels of the defense. "Immunity"
implies that the same defense would apply to all firms within a single regulatory program, but
the defense loses its generality as the nature of regulation begins to vary between firms, as it
increasingly does in industries undergoing change. In addition, the term "exemption" implies
permanence to the decision to suspend antitrust laws, but changes in regulation in the same
regulatory program or involving the same firm may necessitate changes in an antitrust defense.
Hence, this Article uses the term "state-action exception."
25. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 192 2007-2008

ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE

officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
26
Congress.
The Parker approach treats a state legislative body as a "sovereign,"27
presumptively allowing it to regulate private conduct as it sees fit.
The presumption of legitimacy that the antitrust laws afford state
regulation is, however, hardly absolute. Parkeralso left open the possibility
that state regulation could, in some instances, allow firms to engage in
conduct that runs afoul of the Sherman Act. For instance, a state cannot
"give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 5 Significantly, the
Court in Parker noted that California's regulation did not implicate the
Sherman Act because legislators had established an extensive regulatory
apparatus, including a public-approval process and an enforcement
mechanism:
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the
prorate program. Although the organization of a prorate zone is
proposed by producers, and a prorate program, approved by the
Commission, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it
is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the
program and which enforces it 2with penal sanctions, in the
execution of a governmental policy. 9
As Parker suggests, the antitrust state-action exception first serves as a
doctrinal context for judicial scrutiny of private conduct, 30 furthering the
federalism purpose of facilitating participation in the state regulatory
process and, consequently, lending legitimacy to the development of

26. Id. at 350-51.
27. Id.
28. Id.
at 351.
29. Id. at 352.
30. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 39 (1984) (arguing
that antitrust law should design filters "to screen out beneficent conduct and pass only practices
that are likely to reduce output and increase price" and that it is necessary for courts to
.establish rules, recognizing that one cost of decision by rule is occasional over- and underbreadth").
31. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: BalancingPoliticalParticipationand Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 1203, 1250-66 (1997) (arguing that the state-action doctrine "enhanc[es] political
participation in the regulatory process").
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32

regulation. Following the approach of Parker, which embraces a general
presumption against preemption of state regulation under the Sherman Act,
federal courts frequently have embraced strong
33 judicial deference to state
and local regulation in the state-action context.
A.

PREEMPTION,DELEGATION, AND MIDCAL

Parkerembraced deference to state regulation on the rationale that the
Sherman Act did not preempt the state's regulatory approach. An important
recent article by Richard Squire argues that state-action issues in antitrust
cases can be understood entirely through the lens of the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.s4 Squire argues that federal-preemption concerns
should "replace" the state-action exception.3 An extension of an antitrust
state-action exception is, at its core, a refusal to extend federal preemption
to state regulation.
As Parkermade clear, however, states were not afforded carte blanche to
override the Sherman Act. Yet, the case failed to provide a workable
standard for determining when state laws were impermissible under the
Act.16 For the first thirty-five years of its existence, courts interpreted the
state-action exception so as to allow a virtual type of state sovereign
immunity, in which courts strongly deferred to state legislatures and
regulators.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court approved a more
skeptical stance toward state and local regulation in antitrust law,
questioning Parker's deferential approach. In Midcal, the Court refused to
extend the state-action exception to California's wine-pricing scheme, which
did not involve anything more than passive approval of prices. 7 In reaching
this conclusion, Midcal articulated a two-part test to assist modern courts in
evaluating antitrust claims involving state regulation: "First, the challenged
restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
32.

The state-action exception may also serve a judicial-avoidance purpose, providing

federal courts a way of disposing of complex and technical issues without having a binding
impact on state law. However, other legal doctrines, such as abstention (which advises federal
courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction out of comity), adequately protect against the
precedent-creating risk of direct federal-court review of state regulation. See City of Chi. v. Int'l
Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 174 (1997) (allowing federal-court review of state regulatory-law
claims notwithstanding a state-law provision for deferential review, but leaving open the

possibility of a lower court applying abstention principles). Abstention can be invoked where a
federal court is making a decision that has a binding effect on state law. By contrast, in antitrust

litigation, courts are not normally passing judgments on the merits of state regulation, but are
focused on the merits of private conduct under federal law.
33. This strong deference to state and local regulation is observed in the recent FTC
analysis of the state-action exception. IFTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
34. Squire, supranote 11, at 77.
35. Id. at 79.
36. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
37. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 97 (1980).
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policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."" 8
This test seems simple enough. Only if a state legislature expressly envisions
monopolistic conduct and delegates authority to a governmental body to
supervise such conduct actively will the conduct escape antitrust
enforcement. A court must be satisfied that both parts of the test have been
met before extending the state-action exception in an antitrust claim.
In application, though, courts have struggled with the antitrust stateaction doctrine, often because different institutions within a state take on
various regulatory roles and the nature of regulation varies so much from
industry to industry. While the state-action exception might be intended to
create a safe harbor for state or local political and regulatory processesdisplacing courts as overseers of private monopolistic conduct-the judicial
decisions addressing the state-action doctrine are hardly consistent or
principled. The Supreme Court's current approach to the antitrust stateaction doctrine also seems to ignore how judicial deference in this context
can increase incentives for rent-seeking in ways that may prove harmful to
social welfare in the state and local lawmaking process.
The application of the state-action exception in the context of local
governments (such as municipal bodies), as opposed to states, highlights the
current judicial misadventure with the doctrine.3 9 In a short-lived line of
cases, the Supreme Court read the state-action doctrine narrowly in the
context of municipal, as opposed to state, regulation. The Court in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulde¢ subjected municipal
governments to antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Brennan distinguished between states regulating as
states-entitled to the state-action defense under a federalism rationaleand states regulating as political subdivisions-exempt from antitrust
enforcement only when they are implementing state policy, not when they
are acting as municipal governments.4a The City of Boulder's moratorium
on cable-television expansion was thus subject to antitrust challenge because
Colorado, at the state level, had not clearly expressed a policy to regulate
cable television; in fact, Justice Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado
had no state-wide policy at all-finding there was a suspicious gap in state
38.
39.

Id. at 105 (citation omitted).
Commentary on the applicability of state-action immunity to local governments is

robust. See generally, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-MunicipalAction "Antitrust

Cases, 61 TEX. L. REv. 481 (1982); Easterbrook, supra note 10; DanielJ. Gifford, The Antitrust
State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1257 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp
&John A. Mackerron 111, MunicipalRegulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719
(1985); John E. Lopatka, State Action and MunicipalAntitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1984); Glen 0. Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 131 (1983); C. Paul
Rogers II1, MunicipalAntitrust Liability in a FederalistSystem, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305.
40. Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
41.
Id. at 52-53.
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regulation. 41 City of Boulder correctly recognized that a judicial reluctance to
extend the state-action exception from antitrust enforcement is justified in
the context of municipal regulation, given the higher propensity for interestgroup exploitation of local, as opposed to state-wide, legislative processes. 43
A more recent line of cases, however, departs from the municipal-state
distinction that Justice Brennan laid down in the context of cable-television
regulation. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court abandoned the
clear-articulation
requirement in assessing municipal state-action
immunity. 44 Instead, Justice Powell reasoned in his majority opinion that so
long as a state confers permissive authority in general terms for a
municipality to deal with a matter, this suffices to exclude the conduct from
antitrust enforcement. 45 Thus, when the state of Wisconsin granted
municipalities the authority to establish sewage-treatment plants, this
impliedly granted municipal governments the power to make decisions
regarding which populations would be served. 46 Justice Powell recognized
that municipalities may exercise "purely parochial public interests" which, at
some level, could be subject to antitrust enforcement. 7 However, in his view,
a state delegation to a municipal government alone is sufficient to meet the
"clearly expressed and fully articulated" criterion of antitrust state-action
doctrine, thus exempting from antitrust enforcement a large range of
municipal regulation. Under this approach, an "express mention" by a
legislature of its intent to displace competition is not necessary (although
perhaps it would be sufficient); instead, the Court suggests, what matters is
that the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct is a "foreseeable result" of the
48
state policy.

In addition, at least in the original Midcal formulation, the state-action
doctrine requires courts to determine how active and involved a regulatory
scheme must be for purposes of deeming it "actively supervised. 49 In Hallie,
however, the Court effectively abandoned the requirement of active state

42. Mdat 54-55. Justice Brennan was clear that "mere neutrality" by the state regarding
municipal regulation does not suffice. Id. at 55. Instead, a "clear articulation and affirmative
expression" to replace antitrust enforcement with regulation is necessary. Id.
43. Reacting to the prospect of liability created by City of Boulder, Congress abolished
money-damage liability under the antitrust laws for municipalities, their officials, and private

persons acting under the direction of local governments and their officials in the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984. See H.R. REP. No. 965, at 2, 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4619-20. Congress continued, however, to authorize antitrust liability for
private conduct that municipal governments have sanctioned or authorized.
44. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).
45. Id. at 42-43.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 41-42.
49. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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supervision, at least insofar as it applies to municipalities. 50 In so holding,
the Court explained that the purpose of state supervision is to ensure that
municipalities pursue regulatory policies for public purposes and not to
enrich private actors. 5' According to the Court, "Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is
acting to further his own interests rather than the government interests of
the State., 52 However, the Court reasoned that if a state has clearly
authorized a municipality to act, there is no such problem. Instead, "[t]he
only real danger is that it will seek to further purely parochial public
interests at the expense of more overriding state goals."5 3 Thus, if some clear
state authorization exists, either expressly or by virtue of foreseeable results,
the Court held that there is no need to make a finding that the
state actively
54
supervises the municipality's regulation of the private activity.
While this approach envisions some judicial inquiry into the
"foreseeable results" of policy adopted by a state legislative body, the Court
has never defined exactly what such a divination of legislative intent would
entail.55 Appellate courts following this approach frequently invoke the stateaction exception based almost exclusively on a clear legislative purpose, or a
clear statement to allow the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. 56 Beyond

this, however, they generally engage in judicial restraint, deferring to state
regulation of public-utility monopolies under the antitrust laws.5 ' Agency
deference has some inevitable appeal in a complex regulatory environment,
but the Court's relaxation of a state-supervision requirement for
municipalities is counterintuitive if not incoherent. Since Madison's
Federalist No. 10, scholars have recognized that state and local political
processes are more susceptible to interest-group exploitation than their
federal counterpart. 5s The premise that private interests are not likely to
exploit municipal regulation at the expense of the public good ignores the
high risk of interest-group rent-seeking at the local level, where the
incentives for ex ante lobbying of the regulator are perhaps strongest. At the
local level, the costs to firms of organizing and lobbying regulators are much

50.

Town of Hallie, 471 U.S at 46-47.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 47.

53.

Id.

54. Id. at 44.
55. For a discussion of this aspect of Hallie, see Elizabeth Trujillo, Antitrust State-Action
Exemption Collides with Deregulation:Rehabilitatingthe ForeseeabilityDoctrine, 11 FORDHAMJ. CORP. &
FIN. L. 349, 369-70 (2006).
56. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
57. For discussion and criticism, see infra Part I.B.
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (describing how economic and class
interests of politicians will influence legislation, especially in local as opposed to national
lawmaking). See generally JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1996).
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lower than at the state level. In addition, at the state and local level, extreme
interest groups are more likely to wield influence, while at the national level
extremist groups are more likely to cancel each other out.
Although the Court seems to embrace a federalism-based formalism as a
rationale for deference to municipal regulation, this account of federalism
proves too much. It can result in state delegation to municipal governments
with no strings attached, thus insulating private behavior at the local level
from almost all antitrust enforcement. Further, it focuses on the mere
formalistic articulation of state goals by a state body, without addressing
their purposes. States, as well as municipal governments, sometimes regulate
in ways that allow private interests to place their own economic well-being
ahead of the public good. Allowing the law to insulate such private conduct
from antitrust scrutiny may have serious consequences, especially in
deregulated markets where municipal utilities providing electric, gas,
telephone, and cable services can readily subvert competition policies with
little or no scrutiny.
In the context of municipal regulation, the Court's state-actionexception cases view the clear-articulation and active-supervision
requirements as converging into a one-step foreseeability test, in which the
judicial role is focused on divining legislative intent. Fortunately, a more
recent case on the topic clarifies that the active-supervision requirement is
alive and well as an independent criterion where the conduct of state, as
opposed to municipal, regulators is at issue-although the Court's decision
also raises many questions about the scope of the application of this market
to many private arrangements in deregulated markets. In FTC v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co., the Court addressed the extension of the state-action
exception to the rate-setting activities of title-insurance companies in several
states. 6° Most of the states regulating the title-insurance defendants
permitted private insurers to jointly file rates, which state officials could
review or allow to remain in effect. 61 The record of the case suggested that
the states engaged in no significant review of the rates. 62 The FTC had
conceded that the state statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed
rates met the clear-articulation requirement, 63 but the Court found the
agency's review did not constitute active supervision and thus failed the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985).
FTC v. Ticor Tide Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992).
Id. at 627.
In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred. Id. at 630.
Id. at 631. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, following a First Circuit decision,

held that the existence of a funded and authorized state program met the active-supervision
requirement. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1140 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing New Eng.
Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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second step of Midcal' 4 Hence, the Court concluded that a party could
challenge the allegedly anticompetitive acts of the insurers. 65
Squire's recent federalism approach attempts to explain these and
other cases as interpreting the Sherman Act to preempt the state regulatory
program where the state regulations seek to confer monopoly profits on
market participants by constricting output.6 6 His approach would replace an

independent antitrust state-action exception with an inquiry into
preemption that hinges on a federal court's determination of the costs a
state chooses to incur under state law. As Squire explains:
[A] state which takes control over market prices incurs costs the
state could avoid if its only goal were to confer monopoly profits on
producers. These costs are pricing distortions, higher
administrative expenses, and constituency protest. A state's
willingness to incur these costs thus suggests that the state's
regulatory objectives do not clash with federal antirust policy. My
proposed preemption doctrine therefore allows states to suspend
price competition among producers if the state also steps in to set
67
market prices.
Squire's approach, which emphasizes the costs a state chooses to incur in its
regulatory approach, provides a tidy explanation for why private conduct
sanctioned under traditional state price regulation-such as franchise and
cost-of-service regulation of electric utilities-is generally not subject to
antitrust attack. His analysis would focus antitrust state-action-exception
analysis entirely on whether a regulatory regime's objectives conflicted with
the purposes of the Sherman Act; where they did, federal preemption and
antitrust enforcement would be appropriate.68 His approach also implicitly
assumes that courts should interpret the Sherman Act broadly, given the
public-interest goal of protecting competition. Hence, Squire's
approach
• 69
endorses a presumption that is generally in favor of preemption.
The federalism approach may have some traction in explaining some of
the twentieth-century cases, but it is problematic in two main respects. First,
it wrongly assumes that in passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended state
and local regulation to be understood as imposing costs. There is no single,
fixed meaning to the open-ended terms of the Sherman Act. Congress was

64. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 639.
65. Id. at 640
66. See generally Squire, supra note 11.
67. Id. at 79-80
68. Id. at 79.
69. As Squire states, "the required limitations must reflect the Act's general purpose to
prevent marketplace wealth transfers from consumers to producers, and yet must honor
Congress's additional mandate that rules of antitrust be more deferential to state lawmakers
than they are to market participants." Id. at 107.

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 199 2007-2008

93 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2007]

focused on a wide range of broad goals in adopting the Sherman Act,
71
70
including economic efficiency, protecting consumer welfare, preserving
72
competition, and protecting the political process from dominance by large
corporate interests.73 There is, however, no evidence that when Congress
adopted the Sherman Act it embraced such a strong efficiency
understanding of antitrust enforcement that would have condemned
widespread state regulation of activities-especially based on costs. By
contrast, there is substantial evidence that Congress intended to leave in
place a broad range of state regulation and to leave the evaluation of the
appropriateness of future state and local regulation to the courts.74 At the
time Congress adopted the Sherman Act, state and local governments widely
accepted regulation of a variety of private activities, including grain ratesetting, bridge tolls, sewage regulation, railroad regulation, and other widely
accepted regulatory approaches ranging from bans on prostitution to state
and local taxes and rent control.75 There is also substantial evidence that the
drafters and primary sponsors of the Sherman Act were focused primarily on
the evil of the pursuit of "greed" by the few at the expense of the many.76
According to Senator Hoar, a member of the Judiciary Committee that
drafted the final version of the Sherman Act:
When ...we are dealing with one of... the combinations aimed at
chiefly by this bill, we are dealing with a transaction the only
purpose of which is to extort from the community, monopolize,
segregate, and apply to individual use, for the purposes of
individual greed, wealth which ought properly and lawfully and for
the public 77interest to be generally diffused over the whole
community.
As Elhauge has indicated in his survey of the history surrounding adoption
of the Sherman Act, "Not once did a congressman condemn a restraint

See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-91, 110-12 (1978).
71.
See generally Robert H. Land, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that
Congress passed the Sherman Act to protect consumer welfare).
70.

72.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:

PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION

42

(2005).
73. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053-58
(1979).
74. See 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("I admit that it is
difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations.
This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case."); see also id. at 2558
(statement of Sen. Turpie); id. at 3148 (statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 4089 (statement of
Rep. Culberson); id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. Bland).
75. Elhauge, supra note 13, at 700.
76. Id. at 699-700.
77. 21 CONG. REc. 2728 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
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imposed by financially disinterested actors," such as state or local
regulators. 789
Second, in application, a federalist approach that is focused on the costs
of state and local regulation answers none of the difficult questions that
courts confront today in state-action-immunity cases. Put simply, this
approach does not provide a workable set of standards for courts to decide
modern state-action-exception issues, especially those of the type that the
FIC has recently identified as being of concern. 79 At its core, as recent stateaction-exception cases illustrate, issues of delegation within state
governments are as significant to judicial decisions to extend antitrust
exceptions as pure assessments of the substantive purposes of antitrust law or
economic efficiency. In deciding to extend state-action immunity, modern
courts focus not only on federalist principles, but they also pay attention to
the procedures under which a state regulator makes its decision. 80 The
delegation inquiry in state-action-exception cases provides an especially
useful set of tools for courts in addressing problems of extending antitrust
laws to private conduct that is sanctioned through regulatory inaction in
industries undergoing change.
Indeed, a pure federalist approach must confront how state regulators
still may be entitled to deference notwithstanding ambiguity under the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court's longstanding presumption against
preemption-an interpretive canon that reflects a desire to protect state
regulatory processes and state and local sovereignty-advises strongly against
allowing state regulation ever to take priority over the Sherman Act.81 As a
general matter, the Court requires a "clear statement" or other strong
evidence of a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" before finding that
federal legislation preempts a state law.82 If such a presumption were to
apply explicitly in the context of antitrust law, the judicial decision reflected
in antitrust state-action doctrine would hinge on federal, not state,
regulation.

78.
79.

Elhauge, supra note 13, at 700.

See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-36 (discussing the problem of
broad regulatory regimes).
80. For example, this dual focus on federalist principles and procedures is the best
interpretation of Midcal. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing California
Retail LiquorDealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.).
81.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
82. Id. at 230; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (seeking a "clear indication" that Congress authorized the agency
to "invoke the outer limits" of congressional authority, and commenting that "[t]his concern
[about agency authority] is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment on a traditional state power");
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("'[Tlhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,
103 (1963))).
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Squire's response to this concern in defending a federalism-based
understanding of state action is to read the Sherman Act broadly as national
public-interest legislation that ought to generally preempt narrowly crafted
state and local lawsS'-an approach that is generally consistent with Chicago
School statutory interpretation, which would interpret broadly the procompetition policies of legislative ambiguity in the Sherman Act while
reading narrowly other kinds of legislation as interest-group driven. 4 This
approach to statutory interpretation has some elegance and is particularly
appealing to market-oriented advocates of the Sherman Act. It also takes
into account some process-based concerns in addressing the tension
between state regulation and national competition laws. But its fault is in
giving state and local government short shrift as legitimate political bodies.
Even if scholars acknowledge, as I believe they should, that state and local
decisions are more susceptible to interest-group influence than federal
lawmaking, it does not follow that federal courts should condemn all state
and local process and presumptively favor an ambiguous national statute
over them. A process-based approach to state-action immunity has much
more to lend to the analysis of whether state or local regulations give rise to
an antitrust exception. Specifically, a process-based approach recognizes that
what happens within a state or local governmental unit-how regulatory
decisions are made and by whom-is significant to the decision to suspend
application of the Sherman Act.
In addition, as a practical matter, courts applying the state-action
exception have failed to interpret state laws and local laws consistent with
the Chicago School approach Squire urges. 85 Instead, against the implicit
backdrop of the well-acknowledged presumption against preemption, courts
have largely deferred to state and local regulators. The siren song of vertical
deference has had an overwhelming appeal to federal courts, even where it
is clear that there is mischief in the works at the state and local level. As a
result, courts have extended the state-action exception to many unwarranted
scenarios, even under a substantive-preemption approach based on the cost
considerations that Squire emphasizes.
For example, state and local regulators do not always adopt explicit and
public regulatory programs with well-defined procedures, such as marketing
83. See Squire, supra note 11, at 107 (discussing the Sherman Act's purpose and
preemptive force).
84. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 252-53
(1984) (discussing the Chicago School approach to statutory interpretation). The Chicago
School approach, of course, borrows from a synthesis of Federalist No. 10, in which James
Madison famously cautioned about the interest-group dynamics of lawmaking at the state and
local level, and the statutory interpretation insights of modern public-choice theory, which
favor broad interpretation of public-interest statutes and narrow interpretation of interestgroup legislation. See generally MASHAW, supranote 58 (discussing public-choice theory).
85. See Squire, supra note 11 (proposing to frame the state-action exception entirely in
federal-preemption terms).
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referenda with enforcement mechanisms or cost-of-service hearings. Instead,
state and local regulators are increasingly drawing on different kinds of
regulatory approaches-sometimes designed to restrict competition and
sometimes designed to further it. Some states have banned competition
within the state in industries such as electric power, in which federal law
authorizes (and perhaps even encourages) interstate competition. Some
states have approved restraints between competitors that, unlike the
California raisin-producer marketing program, are not voluntary and do not
contain clear enforcement mechanisms. 87 Some states have abolished costof-service hearings in favor of so called "market-based rates," designed to
further market-oriented goals. 88 In addition, states have increasingly looked
to regulatory disclosure and enforcement regimes that require firms to
provide information to regulators but leave agencies significant discretion in
deciding what to do with such information. Unlike some of the previous
instances in which courts have expressed comfort with state regulation, such
as state ratemaking proceedings, these new approaches challenge courts to
evaluate seriously the effectiveness of state regulatory oversight. To date,
courts simply have not risen to the challenge presented by new approaches
to regulation at the state and local levels.
B.

THE STA TE-A CTIONEXCE-TION AND REGULA TORY INACTION IN INDUSTRIES

UNDERGOING CHANGE

Recent cases involving the antitrust state-action exception, particularly
in the deregulated electric-power industry, illustrate the problem with the
current judicial approach. °° The state-action exception serves as a
conceptual predicate to antitrust enforcement; thus, as a routine defense in
antitrust cases, the exception increasingly plays an important role as

86. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
87. See inftanotes 98-101 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
89. In deregulated telecommunications markets, for example, scholars have observed that
the regulatory model has shifted from firm-specific cost-of-service hearings toward regulating
industry structure through firm-specific tariffs and ex ante rules for defining network access. See
Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV.

701, 707 ("[Plolicymakers have increasingly moved away from tariffs towards more flexible
agreements negotiated on a customer-by-customer basis ... regulators have increasingly begun
to abandon classic rate regulation in favor of a new approach known as 'access regulation.'"); see
alsoJoseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated IndustriesLaw,

98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57, 1364-83 (1998) (describing broader trends toward
detariffing and access regulation across all regulated industries); Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L.

REV. 885, 889-90, 960-70, 980-87, 1002-18 (2003) (describing access regulation in local
telephony).
90. In this context, courts are highly likely to make a determination that the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct was either explicitly envisioned by or foreseeable to state legislators. See
supra notes 50-55 (referencing the foreseeability approach).
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formerly regulated firms become deregulated. 9 ' Yet, according to most
appellate courts, antitrust law's enforcement gates remain closed, allowing
the conduct of many private firms to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether in
emerging competitive markets. Despite Ticor's signal that active supervision
is alive and well as ajudicial basis for evaluation, lower courts-especially the
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits-generally have continued to take a
deferential approach to the antitrust state-action doctrine when reviewing
state regulation in deregulated markets. Even where the issue is state, not
local, regulation, and even where competitive markets for service are
emerging, these courts are not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to apply to
private conduct in formerly regulated industries where there is some state
regulatory scheme, however incomplete it is.
The Tenth Circuit's embrace of particularly broad antitrust immunity
for electric utilities, despite the introduction of competition to large
segments of the industry, is illustrative of the deferential approach to judicial
intervention. For example, the Tenth Circuit extended an antitrust stateaction exemption to Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company's ("OG&E")
conduct based on evidence that the state regulatory agency had "general
supervision" authority over the utility, "including the power to fix all of
OG&E's rates for electricity and to promulgate all the rules and regulations
that affect OG&E's services, operation, and management." 92 The Tenth
Circuit deemed a state agency's power to engage in rate review as itself
sufficient for applying an antitrust state-action exemption,93 effectively
rendering the active-supervision requirement meaningless. While the court
cited a previous case that "found that the use of similar authority over an
electric utility satisfied the active supervision requirement,94 as a basis for
this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence of the
regulator's affirmative use of such authority with respect to the utility whose
conduct was at issue. 95 Moreover, based on a review of the docket index for
both the appellate and trial courts, there is no indication that the Oklahoma
91. See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Regulated
Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 761, 762-63; Jeffrey D. Schwartz, Comment, The Use of Antitrust
State Action Doctrinein the DeregulatedElectric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1999).

92. Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2001).
93. Id.
94.
Id. (citing Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir.
1988)).
95.
The case presents a notable contrast to a later Tenth Circuit case, in which the court
refused to extend a state-action exception to unilateral activity that was not "mandated, nor
authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about" by the state regulator. Telecor Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002). This case is also too narrow in
defining the limits of antitrust state-action doctrine. As is discussed infra, courts should not limit
refusal to extend the state-action exception to purely "unilateral" activity but should also extend
to bilateral activity in which the regulator plays a passive role. See infra notes 271-72 and
accompanying text.
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state regulatory agency made a single filing in the trial or appellate case; it
did not weigh-in as amicus in the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, although
Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") (a nationwide industry association
6
representing private utilities such as OG&E) filed an amicus brief
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach to the
antitrust state-action defense. 97 North Star Steel, a customer located within
the exclusive service territory of MidAmerican, an electric utility in Iowa,
sought to purchase competitively priced electricity and requested that
MidAmerican wheel power to it.98 MidAmerican refused, and North Star
sued, alleging that the utility violated the antitrust laws by refusing to allow
access to its transmission lines. 9 The court found that active supervision of
the utility's conduct existed because an Iowa statute assigned new customers
to exclusive service providers and, in the event there was a conflict over
which provider was in control of a given area, the regulator determined
which provider should occupy the area.'00 The court found that Iowa's
legislature "affirmatively expressed" a policy of displacing competition in the
market for retail electric service. 0 ' The court refused, however, to explore
the substantive basis for the agency's regulatory determinations in defining
exclusive service territories. For instance, even though the state had
experimented with limited "pilot" retail-wheeling programs, 10 the court did
not evaluate how the state agency's efforts to promote competition in power
supply could coexist with its maintenance of exclusive service territories over
transmission and distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on all
of these issues. In fact, the only regulatory action discussed related to the
definition of service territories,' ° 3 not the allocation of power supply or
generation. The court also reasoned that "less pervasive regulatory regimes
have been held to satisfy the active supervision prong." 10 4 On appeal, the
96. This observation is based on a review of the docket indices available through Westlaw
for both the appellate and trial court cases. See Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1220 (No. 00-6047) (showing
that the Oklahoma regulatory agency did not file an amicus brief at the appellate level); TrigenOkla. City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., No. Civ-96-1595-L, 1999 WL 136900 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 19, 1999) (showing that the Oklahoma regulatory agency did not file an amicus brief
at the trial
court level); Brief for Edison Electric Institute as Amicus Curia Supporting
Defendant-Appellant, Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1220 (No. 00-6047) (showing that Edison Electric filed

an amicus brief).
97.
1999).

98.
99.
100.

See N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir.

Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 739.

101. Id. at 736. Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit
assumed for collateral-estoppel purposes that "under Iowa law the exclusive service territory
provisions include the generation of electricity for retail sales." ld at 737-38.

102.

N. Star Steel Co., 184 F.3d at 736.

103.

Id. at 738.

104.

Id. at 739.

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 205 2007-2008

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

L2007]

Iowa Utilities Board filed an amicus brief before the Eighth Circuit
discussing its regulatory approach, 0 5 but the court did not address explicitly
the issue of how much deference it should afford to the state regulator's
position.
One of these "less pervasive" regulatory regimes is blanket state
prohibitions-by statute or regulation-of certain types of pro-competitive
conduct. For example, according to Florida's regulators and courts, Florida
has adopted a statutory prohibition on retail-electric competition, outside of
self-wheeling arrangements (e.g., a supplier transmitting power over the
106
utility's lines for the supplier's own use). Although Florida certainly does
not have a clear legislative statement regarding the issue, Florida's Public
Service Commission ("PSC") adopted a regulation that prohibits retail
wheeling to provide access to competitive power supplies outside of selfwheeling.'0 7 A Florida Supreme Court case had previously interpreted this
regulation to preclude cogenerators from selling their power in the retail
market. 0 8 Accepting both the regulation and the Florida Supreme Court's
characterization of the regulation, the Eleventh Circuit applied the stateaction exemption to preclude an antitrust action by a cogeneration facility
against a utility that refused to wheel power at a competitive rate. °9 The
Florida PSC filed an amicus brief with the Eleventh Circuit, and the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the state regulator's interpretation of Florida
law 0 without discussing the issue of how much deference it should afford to
the agency's interpretation in its brief."'
A way of understanding the antitrust claim before the Eleventh Circuit
is as a collateral attack on the state-agency rule based on a substantive
violation of federal antitrust law. The decision echoes a previous Eleventh
Circuit case in which the court found that the state-action defense protects a

105.

This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw

for the appellate case. Brief for Iowa Utilities Board as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
N. Star Steel Co., 184 F.3d 732 (No. 92-2987).
106. See PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the
legislature's determination "that the protection of the public interest required only limiting
competition in the sale of electric service, not a prohibition against self-generation").
107. See TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1566 n. 17 (11th
Cir. 1996) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 25-17.0882 (2007)).
108. See PW Ventures, Inc., 533 So. 2d at 284 (clarifying its previous decision in Fletcher
Propertiesv. FloridaPublic Service Commission, 356 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1978)).
109. TEC CogenerationInc., 76 F.3d at 1567.
110. This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw
for the appellate case. Brief for Fla. Power et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, TEC
CogenerationInc., 76 F.3d 1560 (No. 88-CV-02145).
111. The court reasoned that "the doors to the PSC were open to all with standing to
complain[,]" but nowhere did the court identify how a private cogenerator might raise such
issues before the Florida PSC. TEC CogenerationInc., 76 F.3d at 1570. Arguably, it could not do
this other than by directly challenging the state-agency regulation authorizing the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct.
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regulated electric utility's division of service territories from Sherman Act
restraint-of-trade claims.' 1 2 Taken together, these Eleventh Circuit opinions
seem to suggest that the mere existence of an agency rule authorizing
anticompetitive conduct is enough to trigger active supervision." 3 If this
holds, however, not only can the actions of a state legislature insulate private
conduct from antitrust liability, but a unilaterally adopted agency rule can
also excuse private conduct from antitrust enforcement, even if this rule
prohibits pro-competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.
This deferential approach to antitrust-enforcement filtering by state
regulatory agencies has serious implications for the enforcement of the
antitrust laws in deregulated markets. In California's deregulated electricpower market, wholesale power suppliers possessing market power allegedly
have engaged in tacit collusion to withhold supply and thus artificially inflate
their prices.' 14 Of course, both federal and state regulation continued, even
in the context of California's failed regulation plan. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") made its own determinations that
individual firms lacked market power and had approved several marketbased tariffs, allowing deregulation in the wholesale market. As to
California's retail market, state agencies also had approved the sale of power
by these suppliers through the state-sanctioned market exchange." 5 To the
extent that the behavior of any private firms operating in this market raised
a plausible Section one 1 6 (or even a Section two) 1 ' antitrust claim under
the Sherman Act, the mere existence of a state-sanctioned and statesupervised market should not give rise to a state-action exception.
112. Praxair, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 611 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
113. lId at 613 ("An agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling
weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation."). In an
earlier case, the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the clear-articulation requirement to find a
state-action exception. See Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 150104 (1 1th Cir. 1991). This seems to take the antitrust state-action exception completely outside
of the two-part Midcal test, turning it into a one-step, clear-articulation requirement. In Southern
Motors Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985), the Court stated, "The
federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt policies that permit, but do not compel,
anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties. As long as the State clearly articulates its
intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied." Id. at 60. In the
same opinion, however, the Court made it clear that the presence or absence of compulsion is
not the "sine qua non to state action immunity." Id.
114. See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant)Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to
Blame for California'sPower Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the
Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. REv. 207 passim (2004); Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman
Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in the CaliforniaElectricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
271 passim (2003).
115. For discussion of this regulatory framework, see generally Jim Rossi, The Electric
Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the
Provisionof Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1768 (2002).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade).
117. Id. § 2 (prohibiting monopolization and attempts to monopolize).
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Judicial decisions that adopt this deferential approach send mixed
signals and present a barrier to plaintiffs seeking to sue under antitrust laws.
Still worse, these decisions invite private manipulation of state and local
regulators to create antitrust immunity. Particularly, as state and local
governments engage in lawmaking in partially deregulated markets, and
move away from the standard regulatory process afforded in a public rate
hearing, the risks of private manipulation of the policy-making process
heightens.'
Given this risk, courts could improve the functioning of
deregulated markets, as well as the political process, if they devised a more
principled way of exercising their filter function in the state-actionexception context.
Since Hallie, the Supreme Court has abandoned the political-process
informed municipal-state distinction in assessing the antitrust state-action
doctrine. In place of this standard, federal courts embrace a highly
deferential stance in reviewing both state and local regulation as they apply
the state-action exception. If a state regulates an activity, courts reviewing
private conduct under complex regulatory schemes are increasingly likely to
imply a regulatory policy-sometimes even absent the state's clear
articulation of a regulatory purpose. 1 9 Given the strong presumption against
preemption, the general approach disfavors judicial intervention in applying
the state-action exception as an antitrust defense.
Many courts also imply the active-supervision prong of the antitrust
state-action doctrine, limiting judicial intervention in many recent cases
involving deregulated electric-power markets, especially in the Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.12 These courts consistently have failed to
evaluate the degree of scrutiny that state or local regulators provide, as well
as whether the purpose of this supervision overlaps with the Sherman Act's
pro-competitive goals. Their approach evinces a serious lapse of the judicial
filtering function in considering antitrust challenges to private conduct in
restructured industries, such as electric power and telecommunications.
Without a judicial safeguard, overbroad judicial endorsement of the stateaction exception allows anticompetitive private conduct to escape scrutiny
altogether and risks undermining the goals of competition law, particularly
as national markets in these industries develop.
1 22
2
In recognition of this serious problem, Easterbrook" and Squire,
along with many other scholars, including John Shepard Wiley, z3 Matthew

118.

See generally MASHAW, supra note 58.

119.

Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct

was either explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators. See Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41-42 (1985) (referencing the foreseeability approach).
120. See supra notes 92-143 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
121. See supra note 10.
122. See supra note 11.
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Spitzer, 2 4 and others,125 have advanced approaches that focus on the
substantive efficiency of state and local regulation, with a particular eye
toward limiting capture in the political process. In contrast, Merrick
Garland, now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, has been one of the most strident proponents of a strongly
deferential approach to the state-action exception in considering the
relevance of state regulation.126 In a leading article, he argues that there is
no principled basis for distinguishing between municipalities and states for
federal-antitrust purposes.12 Put simply, his view is that federal courts should
not assess state and local legislation for either its efficiency or rent-seeking
effects, or for process-based concerns, in antitrust cases. 12 Defenders of
judicial deference in antitrust federalism see judicial review of state and local
laws for efficiency, rent-seeking, or public-interest goals as tantamount to
federal courts returning to substantive-due-process review of state and local
regulation, encroaching on decentralized lawmaking in the economicregulation context. Like advocates of deregulatory takings in public-utility
law attempt to reinvigorate Lochner'29 in determining government liability for
regulatory transitions,1 30 strong-deference advocates are concerned that
judicial intervention in the evaluation of the state-action defense will lead

123. Responding to Halie,John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address the
efficiency and, in particular, public-choice implications of state and local legislation in deciding
whether to accept an antitrust state-action defense. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of
Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748 (1986). According to Wiley, if anticompetitive
legislation is inefficient and the result of producer-interest lobbying, the state-action defense
should not shield conduct authorized under the legislation from scrutiny under the Sherman
Act. Id. at 788-89.
124. Matthew Spitzer argues that federal courts should intervene in evaluating antitrust
claims, notwithstanding state or local legislation, if the legislation is inefficient or transfers
wealth from consumers to producers. Matthew Spitzer, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Rational
Choice PoliticalEconomy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1318-25 (1988).
125. See Cirace, supra note 39, at 515 (arguing that courts should employ an efficiency test
to evaluate the effects of state and local legislation on claims under the Sherman Act); Steven
Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State-Action Doctrine, 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 212 (2000)
(arguing that based on a "status choice" approach courts should inquire "whether a
government actor's conception of the public interest is being furthered by an anticompetitive
restraint").
126.
See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 486 (1987).
127.

Id. at 502-07.

128.

Id. at 519.

129.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

130.
See generallyJ. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRAcT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1997). For a criticism, see generally Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v.
Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1999); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident
Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling
Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77
TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998).
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courts to a Lochner-type review of regulation. 13 Garland, for example, favors
exempting all regulatory actions by state and local governments from
judicial review under the Sherman Act except
for delegations of the power
2
to restrain the market to private parties. 1
Yet, while it has been one-hundred years since the Court decided
133
Lochner, and more than sixty years since it reigned supreme in utility law,
no one-including those who wish to evaluate the efficiency of state
regulations in the antitrust state-action exception context-seriously wishes
to invoke its ghost. 134 Indeed, if courts approached judicial review of
decentralized lawmaking in a principled and cautious manner, a strongly
deferential stance to state regulators would not be necessary to limit the
scope of judicial review. As Daniel Gifford has argued, federal courts have
the capacity to review state and local legislation without directly addressing
their substantive-efficiency effects.' 3 5 Gifford suggests that courts apply the
same "free market" approach to the antitrust state-action exception that they
apply under the dormant Commerce Clause by recognizing two markets. 3
Antitrust state-action evaluation would protect the internal (intrastate)
market from trade restraints, while137the dormant Commerce Clause extends
to the external (interstate) market.
Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld have made perhaps the most
strident political-process-based argument in the antitrust-federalism context.
They argue that the antitrust state-action defense should apply only where
regulation imposes substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests. 138 In
their view, the state-action exception would not remove from antitrust
enforcement all private monopolies sanctioned by regulation but only those
that are actively supervised by the state for purposes of limiting the harms
that flow from unregulated monopoly. 3 9 As such, the active-supervision
prong of the antitrust state-action doctrine is not inherently anti-commerce,
but it recognizes the need for regulation to correct for certain market
failures when the public interest demands it. On this understanding,
enforcement of pro-commerce norms is necessary where the federalismbased value of participation conflicts with efficiency, as can occur if state

131.

Garland, supra note 126, at 488 (making an explicit comparison to Lochner).

132.

Id at 506.

133. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-18 (1944)
(abandoning substantive review of utility rates).
134. Chen, supra note 130, at 1568.
135. Gifford, supra note 12, at 1252-53.

136.
137.
138.
139.
445 U.S.

Id. at 1230-31.
Id at 1272.
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 31, at 1207.
See id. at 1257 (analyzing CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
97, 105 (1980), in which the Court required active state supervision).
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regulation creates spillover costs for those who do not participate in the
relevant state or local regulatory process.140
In contrast to even this modest process-based view of judicial
intervention, recent cases involving utility restructuring illustrate the
problem presented by the low state-action-exemption threshold that many
lower courts currently utilize. While Squire's federalism approach embraces
skepticism in approaching state and local laws, in practice, this type of
approach may further encourage an even more deferential approach given
the well-recognized judicial presumption against preemption. Further, the
substantive-cost criteria for evaluating federal preemption fails to adequately
address state laws that do not take an affirmative regulatory approach.
Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulation, which gives birth to
the norms of competition, private firms face strong incentives to use the
regulatory process to enact partial regulatory schemes for purposes of
establishing immunity from the antitrust laws. As states have begun to
deregulate industries such as telecommunications and electric power, the
nature of state regulation has changed. Rather than regulating utilities
through rate and traditional certificate-of-need proceedings, increasingly
regulators are laying down general structural rules or approving structuralrather than pricing-tariffs.1 4 Most agree that with the rise of competitive
markets antitrust law plays a more-not less-important role than under

140. Id. at 1207.
141.
See Dibadj, supra note 12, at 821 (noting that scholars have suggested that structural
approaches can benefit consumers); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89, at 1350 (analyzing
regulation of monopolistic industries); Spulber & Yoo, supranote 89, at 889-90 (examining the
Telecommunications Act of 1990); see also Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New
Focus for a Competitive Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79, 81 (2000) (proposing that new
structural regulations will increase market competition); Jade Alice Eaton, Recent United States
Department of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility Industry, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 857, 862 (1994)
(noting that regulators increasingly look to remedy antitrust violations via structural remedies);
Craig A. Glazer & M. Bryan Little, The Roles of Antitrust Law and Regulatory Oversight in the
Restructured Electricity Industry, 12 ELECTRCITY J. 21, 22 (1999) (noting the effect of "retail
wheeling" on the roles of regulators); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7
GEO. MASON L. REv. 577, 611 (1999) (arguing that application of antitrust to joint ventures will
require an understanding of their structure); John Burritt McArthur, Antitrust in the New
[DelRegulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1, 55 (1997) (noting that bans on price
discrimination have been a "central part of traditional regulatory structures"); Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Analysis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
639, 639 (arguing for a change of antitrust policy on telecommunications joint ventures);
William Baer, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Perspectives on
Competition Policy and Enforcement Initiatives in Electric Power, Remarks Before the
Conference on the New Rules of the Game for Electric Power: Antitrust and Anticompetitive
Behavior (Dec. 4, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/elecl204.shtm
(arguing in favor of structural remedies); Prepared Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches,
Glasser Legal Works Seminar on Competitive Policy in Communications Industries (Mar. 10,
1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitl.htm (noting the need for non-traditional
antitrust measures in the communications industries).

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 211 2007-2008

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[20071

traditional rate regulation. 142 As one Department of Justice lawyer
recognized in the context of antitrust enforcement in emerging electricpower markets, "'if a state opens its retail market to competition, then the
state action doctrine would not apply to conduct that relates directly to retail
competition."1 43 The reality of separating regulated from unregulated
conduct for antitrust-federalism purposes is hardly simple, however, because
states frequently endorse competition in some, but not all, aspects of
formerly
regulated
industries
such
as
electric
power
and
telecommunications.
It is entirely sound for a court to extend an antitrust state-action
defense where a state or locality has a history of affirmative state
regulation-such as regular hearings to set rates based on cost-and
continues to embrace this regulatory approach. However, courts also extend
the defense where a state official has the jurisdiction to regulate but fails to4
exercise it-even where there is little or no history of regulatory action.'
Courts are also asked to review not only traditional agency decisions, such as
cost-of-service ratemaking, but also to evaluate the state-action implications
of agency inaction, such as an agency's failure to revoke a permit or an
agency's failure to enforce regulations. In such contexts, jurisdiction or
vague reference to a past history of regulation is of little or no relevance to
how state regulators approach the problem today. Private antitrust
defendants or regulators can proffer regulatory rationales on appealincluding the relationship between regulation and competition-rather
than at the time the agency adopts a specific regulatory approach. To the
extent state regulators provide any rationale at all (and in many instances
they do not make any filings in antitrust litigation), they only address the
failure to regulate ex post in briefs filed in antitrust cases. When a state
regulator does file an amicus brief, courts do not address the level of
deference they ought to afford the agency's position. 45
At one extreme, the presumption against preemption results in too
much deference to state regulators. At the other extreme, the federalism
approach, when coupled with the Chicago School skepticism of state and
local regulation, results in too little deference. What both approaches share
is that they treat all state and local regulators homogeneously, without
142.

See Dibadj, supra note 12, at 763-64 (describing the Post-Chicago School and its

proposals for limited antitrust); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89, at 1350 (explaining the
necessity of imposing new regulations in monopolistic industries); Spulber & Yoo, supra note
89, at 888 (arguing for the enforcement of regulations of the telecommunications industry).
143. Joseph F. Schuler, State Action Doctrine, Losing Relevance, Department of Justice Attorney
Says, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1999, at 70 (quoting Milton A. Marquis, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Antitrust Division).

144. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's extension
of an antitrust state-action exemption based on a state agency's apparent authority to engage in
rate review).
145.

See supra notes 96, 105, 110 (referencing briefs filed in appeals).
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regard to institutional and other variables that influence the accountability
of regulation at the state and local level. 46 As argued infra, antitrust stateaction-exemption cases could learn from a delegation approach and Chevron
step two's focus on reasons, rather than antitrust law's emphasis on clear
statements, jurisdictional delegation, and agency actions. Giving reasons
would allow federal courts to evaluate whether officials have legitimate goals
in mind in refusing to regulate, or whether they are merely opting out of
antitrust enforcement to favor powerful interest groups at the state and local
level. In addition, such an approach could force state officials to provide
reasons before making a decision not to regulate conduct, subjecting such
reasons to review within a state's regulatory system.
II.

CHEVRON, DELEGATION, AND REASONABLENESS REVIEW

The Chevron case, 14 often seen as a very pro-agency approach to the
judicial review of regulation, has attracted the attention of administrative-law
scholars since the Court decided it in 1984. Chevron stands at the center of
many major recent Supreme Court decisions. 48 In Mead, decided in 2001,
the Court signaled a clear retreat away from application of the Chevron test
49
as the exclusive model for reviewing agency interpretations of law.'
However, Chevron remains the predominant controlling framework for most
courts and commentators approaching judicial review of agency legal
interpretations, as well as agency policy decisions made in the context of
broad legislative delegations. 150 The rationale of Chevron deference and

146.
Squire does emphasize that, ultimately, process matters in some way to the assessment
of state regulation, but his test for assessing the sufficiency of process is limited to assessing
whether the decisionmaker gives independent weight to interests of both sides to a transaction.

Squire, supra note 11, at 116. Hence, a one-sided ratemaking proceeding, whether before a
legislature or a regulatory agency, would be problematic under his view, but he is willing to
allow regulators to "enrich producers by raising prices, as long as consumer interests enjoy
independent weight in the price-selection method." Id. This helps to sustain the preemption
approach's promise of being "[d]eferential . . .but not toothless." Id. at 107. But, such an
approach relegates process to a mere evidentiary role in assessing whether the Sherman Act
preempts state or local regulation.
147. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
148. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 253-60 (2006); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-86 (2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222
(2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001); Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88
(2000); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
149. In Mead, the Court suggested that Skidmore rather than Chevron will provide the
appropriate standard for reviewing courts in approaching many agency legal interpretations.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230.
150. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REv. 1443, 1446 (2005) (criticizing lower courts' approach to applying Mead as a kind
of "Chevron avoidance"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules
and Meta-Standards,54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809 (2002) (observing that Chevron continues to
apply after Mead as a meta-rule or meta-standard governing the scope of deference); Cass R.
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many aspects of its application involving delegation concerns strongly
parallel the kinds of issues courts confront when they address antitrust
immunities and defenses, such as the state-action exception.
A.

THE RISE OF THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK

Justice Stevens's unanimous Chevron opinion articulates what has
become the predominant judicial paradigm for reviewing agency
interpretations of statutes and regulations. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") reasonable
interpretation of the term "stationary sources" in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.15 The statute required "'new or modified major
stationary sources"' of air pollution to comply with certain permit
requirements
52 and authorized the EPA to define the relevant terms by
regulation.
Initially, the EPA determined that the "stationary source
referred to each individual piece of equipment that emitted pollution, but
in 1981 the Agency changed the definition to mean an entire plant. 53 As an
effect of this new interpretation, firms could avoid some pollution-permit
requirements by reducing emissions from old equipment in
order to offset
54
emissions from new equipment installed in the same plant.
The Chevron Court's approach to reviewing an agency's statutory
interpretation distills judicial review into two distinct questions. At step one
of the Chevron approach, the Court inquires into whether Congress "has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 15 5 If Congress has-and has
done so clearly-the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." 156 If, however, the statute at issue is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific question, a court is to move on to Chevron's step
two. At step two, a court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the
agency's legal interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." 57 At step two, Chevron endorses judicial deference to the agency's
statutory interpretation by giving the agency's regulations "controlling
weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
58
statute."1
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006) (describing the significance of Step
Zero, "the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all," but retaining
Chevron as the overarching framework); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (noting that Chevron "dramatically expanded
the circumstances in which courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes").
151.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9595, 91 Stat. 685.
152. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (2000)).
153. Id. at 840.
154. Id. at 858-59.
155. Id. at 842.
156. Id. at 843.
157.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
158. Id. at 844.
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Justice Marshall's exhortation in Marbury v. Madison that it is "the
'' 5
province and duty of the judicial department ... to say what the law is 9
thus takes a back seat to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency's
legal interpretation at step two of Chevron. In this sense, one might see
160
Surely, however, the
Chevron as having a basis in separation of powers.
power to define the balance of powers in judicial review remains within
Congress's prerogative, as illustrated by the many statutes in which Congress
has defined standards of review or even abolished judicial review altogether.
Rather than separation of powers, Chevron is best explained by a more
pragmatic set of institutional concerns aimed at improving the quality of
agency decisions and the accountability of the process that produces them.
An appreciation of agency expertise, the limits of the specialized knowledge
of judges, and political accountability are at the normative core of Justice
Stevens's rationale for deference to the agency in Chevron. As Justice Stevens
wrote in Chevron, 'Judges are not experts in the field," and thus in
interpreting statutory gaps courts should "rely upon the incumbent
6
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments."' ' Justice
Stevens emphasized that judicial deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation furthers political accountability:
a
represents
interpretation
[EPA]
Administrator's
[T]he
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and
Congress intended to accommodate
is entitled to deference ....
both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity
presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the
Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so;
perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and
perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of
to take their chances
the question, and those on each side decided
16
with the scheme devised by the agency. 2
Implicit in Justice Stevens's accountability rationale is the recognition that
agencies are institutionally superior to courts in their capacity for making
accountable political decisions against the backdrop of ambiguous statutory

159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
160. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 476 (1989) ("It is surely a far more remarkable step that Chevron
acknowledged to number among Congress's constitutional prerogatives the power to compel
courts to accept and enforce another entity's view of legal meaning whenever the law is

ambiguous.").
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
161.
162. Id.
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terms. 16 Agency legal interpretations will be subject to political oversight
and thus are accountable to presidential politics, as well as congressional
oversight. 164 In addition, as Professor Peter Strauss has argued, for reasons of
judicial economy Chevron promotes uniformity in regulatory policy. Because
the Supreme Court has limited resources to resolve conflicting statutory
interpretations by lower courts, judicial acceptance of agency legal
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms will promote uniformity in
interpretation, providing regulated entities and other branches of
government some degree of certainty in assessing the meaning of
ambiguous statutory terms.165
Thus, while some commentators consider separation of powers' 66 or
congressional intent to delegate lawmaking authority as the primary
rationale for Chevron deference, 167 other commentators accept political
accountability and institutional concerns as the principle justifications for
the doctrine.166 Although scholars have observed that the direct impact of
Chevron on the doctrinal approach of the lower courts is sometimes
overstated,169 studies suggest that the decision did affect the reversal and
remand rates for judicial appeals of agency decisions in lower courts."7

163. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 96-97 (1994).
164. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990)
(explaining that Chevron is justified by the agency's superior political accountability). At the
extreme, this view sees Chevron as working pure unitary-executive principles.
165.
See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1122-26

(1987).
166.
See, e.g., Farina, supra note 160, at 476; see also Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
SeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 189-90, 202-03 (1992)
(using constitutional concerns of institutional roles of Congress to distinguish deference
analysis for interpretive rules and legislative rules); Randolph J. May, Tug of Democracy:Justices
Pullfor America's Separation of Powers, LEGAL TIMES, July 9, 2001, at 51 (applauding Mead on the
ground that its limits on Chevron are consistent with constitutional principles).
167.
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150 (arguing that courts should define the Chevron
doctrine with respect to Congress's intent to delegate lawmaking authority to an agency).
168.
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron 's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REv.
201, 223 ("The only workable approach is the approach that Chevron took in the beginning: to
fill in legislative silence about judicial review by making policy choices based on institutional
attributes, with Congress then free to overrule these conclusions.").
169.

See Merrill, supranote 20 at 980-85.

170.
Professors Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliott observe that "[a]ffirmance increased by
almost [fifteen] percent after Chevron, and both remands and reversals declined by roughly
[forty] percent." Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1058. The authors concluded, "On the
evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is sometimes able to effectively shape the courtagency relationship through the kind of relatively broad, open-textured rule adopted in
Chevron." Id. at 1059. Another study found that the D.C. Circuit's deference to EPA
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B.

EXTENDING CHEVRON REV/EW TO STATmECONOMIC REGU.A 'lY0N

Apart from a very active current debate regarding the scope of Chevron
deference, courts have struggled with two issues in applying Chevron to the
review of agency regulation. The purpose of this Article is not to catalog the
entire range of problems that courts have confronted,' but to highlight the
issues that are most relevant in expanding Chevron's delegation structure to
antitrust immunities and defenses. First, at step one of the Chevron inquiry,
courts have struggled with the role of non-textual information regarding
statutory meaning. Although there is substantial disagreement on what
sources courts should draw on when discerning statutory meaning, step one
of the Chevron inquiry creates incentives for clear legislative statements, thus
enhancing the transparency of the legislative process. Second, while courts
have struggled with the appropriate approach to the second step of Chevron,
recent judicial and scholarly focus on the procedural issues presented at step
two have a particular traction in the context of assessing state and local
regulation.
1.

Step One's Limits as a Clear-Statement Rule

At step one of the Chevron inquiry, a court focuses on what the statute
means-a task judges have the experience and institutional competence to
perform without drawing on other expertise. Discerning meaning remains a
controversial judicial task, but if a court can resolve the issue of statutory
meaning, it is the judicial prerogative to determine whether an agency's
regulatory approach violates the statute. The Court played this role in cases
such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the FDA lacked authority to regulate cigarettes as nicotine-delivery
"devices"
subject to FDA jurisdiction under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
2
7

Act. 1

One popular approach to conceptualizing step one of the Chevron
inquiry focuses on the background incentives favoring legislative delegation.
The basic approach is to understand step one as creating incentives for clear
and comprehensive legislation and against broad delegations. Under this
view, if Congress wishes for courts to restrain agencies, it should use clear
and unambiguous language in the legislation it passes. Justice Scalia, for
example, has praised Chevron for creating an incentive for Congress to use
interpretations increased after Chevron. Aaron P. Avila, Applications of the Chevron Doctrine in the
D.C. Circuit,8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398, 403, 431 (2000).
171.
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150, at 848-52 (cataloging a range of "unresolved
questions" with Chevron's application).
172.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). Einer Elhauge
defends this result by arguing that the Court was following current enactable congressional
preferences, as is appropriate where the Court reviews agency interpretations of ambiguous
provisions. Einer Elhauge, Preference EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2027,
2148-54 (2002).
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clear language in statutes: "Congress now knows that the ambiguities it
creates ...

will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation,

not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will
ordinarily be known." 73
Put another way, judicial deference to an agency-triggered by the stepone inquiry of whether Congress failed to use clear language to limit an
agency's policy choices-serves as a "default rule" which, on a case-by-case
basis, Congress can change. 7 4 Where Congress is sloppy, as frequently
occurs in drafting statutes, Congress and interest groups face the potential
"penalty" ofjudicial deference at step two, generally reaffirming the agency's
view. Einer Elhauge, for example, has argued that the Chevron doctrine
allocates authority between courts and agencies in a way that is designed to
ensure that
the resolution of statutory
ambiguity will best match current
(majoitarin)
r
175
(majoritarian) government preferences. In this sense, step one of Chevron
can operate as a type of clear-statement rule, designed to elicit statutory
clarity from Congress where there is a majoritarian preference supporting
clarity. A desirable by-product of such an approach is to channel interestgroup lobbying efforts to focus on Congress, not agencies or courts, making
it more likely that legislative decisions better reflect majoritarian
preferences.
While clear statements at Chevron's step one have an appealing
democracy-forcing function, if approached too aggressively they invite
judicial mischief and, by hamstringing agencies on programmatic details for
which congressional revision is unlikely, may undermine sound regulatory
policy. Indeed, according to one understanding of the judicial role at
Chevron's step one, a court's primary emphasis is on whether clear and
unambiguous language prohibits or precludes a regulator from exercising
discretion in a certain way: at the extreme, such an approach invites
aggressive judicial attribution of clear statutory meaning as a way of limiting
agency discretion and avoiding Chevron's step-two deference. 176 In contrast to
173. Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511,517.
174. See id. (describing Chevron as a "background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate"); Merrill, supra note 20, at 978 (referring to Chevron as a "default rule" that Congress
can change).
175. Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2162 (arguing for preference-eliciting default rules in
statutory interpretation).
176. For a notable Supreme Court case illustrating this activist approach to applying
Chevron step one, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). There, the majority's stepone analysis (applied to reverse the INS) was so searching that it prompted Justice Scalia to
argue that it "implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an
agency whenever ... they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the
statute." Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia protested that the Court's "approach
would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would
otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an
evisceration of Chevron." Id.
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this oft-criticized approach, the predominant approach of courts in
reviewing an agency's interpretation at Chevron's step one focuses on
whether a statutory gap or ambiguity exists, leaving questions
about how an
177
agency exercises discretion for resolution at step two.

2.

Step Two as a Reason-Giving Requirement

Step two of Chevron assumes that the statute itself does not answer the
question of whether an agency's action is valid. While many courts are
extremely deferential in reviewing agency action at step two, most
commentators today see step two as co-existing with a type of reasonableness
review of agency action designed to manage the discretion exercised by the
agency. In endorsing "hard look" review, the Supreme Court has stated that
a rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the decision
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not •be178ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
The notice-and-comment process legally binds the agency to produce
explanatory material in the form of a statement of general basis and
purpose. 9 Thus, the rigors of hard-look review promote deliberation and
accountability1s° and protect against arbitrariness.
Several recent
commentators emphasize that such an approach to arbitrary-and-capricious
review addresses delegation-type concerns. 8 2 Others have observed that
177.

Chevron itself embraced such an approach:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation . . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a

particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, the court may

not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of the agency.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). See also
generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 150 (adopting a delegation approach to Chevron step
one, in which courts focus on whether a gap or ambiguity exists).
178. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
180. See Seidenfeld, supra note 163, at 128-30 (advocating a more exacting scrutiny of
agencies' statutory interpretation).
181. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461 (2002) (suggesting ways of solving the problem of
agency legitimacy).
182. See id. at 518 (arguing that meaningful standards make administrative law "ordinary" as
opposed to "constitutional"); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing Bressman,
Stack, and Criddle).
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hard-look review serves a "signaling" function by allowing courts to
overcome their comparative informational disadvantage in assessing
complex technical and policy issues vis-A-vis other branches to the extent
that a "court can reason that the expert government decisionmaker's
willingness to provide an explanation signals 83that the government believes
the benefits of the proposed policy are high.'
Indeed, evidence suggests that courts find attractive the kind of
heightened review reflected in a process-based approach to step two. While
observers have
noted that, in practice,
step-two Chevron review is so lenient
is
1'84
that it is almost meaningless,
lower courts take hard-look review more
seriously.18 5 The Court's failure to reverse an agency decision at step two of
Chevron characterized the first fifteen years following the decision; but in at
least two recent cases, the Court has adopted a more rigorous approach,
reversing and remanding agency action where regulators failed to provide
adequate reasons for their decisions. If public-choice concerns justify such
review in the context of federal agencies,"" such concerns are even more
salient in the context of state and local economic regulation. Moreover, two
of the main rationales for strong Chevron deference at the federal level are
inapposite to the state- and local-government contexts: the nationaluniformity interest in strong Chevron deference is simply not applicable,' ss
and the unitary executive' 8 is foreign to most state and local governments,
where the more predominant executive governance model is governance by
plural executive or by commission rather than a single executive-branch
official.' 9"
183. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of 'Hard Look' Review, 58 ADMIN. L.
REv. 753, 755 (2006).
184. Seidenfeld, supra note 163, at 84; see also Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997) (noting that as of 1997, the Supreme
Court had never struck down an agency interpretation by relying squarely on Chevron's step
two).
185. See Levin, supra note 184 (examining a series of D.C. Circuit opinions that apply steptwo review).
186. In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999), the Supreme Court
arguably relied on Chevron's step two to reverse the agency's decision. Also, in American
Trucking, the Court relied on step two in reversing and remanding the EPA's rule. Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001).
187. See Bressman, supra note 21, at 483 (citing public-choice concerns).
188. Peter Strauss has advanced Chevron deference as a way of promoting uniformity in
agency interpretations and policy approaches. See Strauss, supra note 165, at 1121. Deference to
a state or local regulator may further uniformity but only within the state or local jurisdiction at
issue and not at the national level.
189. See supra note 20 (citing Merrill and Paulsen).
190. For discussion of divergence between governors under state constitutions and the U.S.
President, see William P. Marshall, Break up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2467-68 (2006) (contrasting the federal
unitary executive with the model of the state executive, which is typically plural); Jim Rossi,
Overcoming Parochialism:State Administrative Procedure and InstitutionalDesign, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
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Chevron's step two has four additional implications for the delegation
issues that courts routinely address in applying the antitrust state-action
exception. First, under Chevron, courts are frequently asked to address how
deference relates to the presumption against preemption. In the antitrust
context, the deference issue demands a different analysis given that vertical
rather than horizontal deference is at issue. Second, private delegations have
historically called for heightened judicial review in administrative law, in
large part as a constitutional-avoidance mechanism. Third, as has long been
recognized, courts frown on agencies providing reasons for their decisions
after the fact, as occurs when an agency provides a post hoc rationale for its
position in a brief filed in a judicial proceeding. Fourth, the hard-look
doctrine can not only extend to affirmative-agency decisions to regulate, but
can and should also be used to attack agency failures to act.
Courts are frequently called on to address how Chevron relates to
federalism-oriented concerns, such as the federal government's respect for
decentralized decisionmaking and state sovereignty. The approach of those
who embrace a federalism-based understanding of the state-action
exception, such as Squire, would see preemption of state regulation of
antitrust cases-i.e., a judicial finding of no state-action exception-as
applying only where a court makes an affirmative finding that the regulatory
purposes of a state approach conflict with the purposes of the Sherman
Act. 1 However, casting the antitrust state-action defense entirely as a
federalism issue, such as a background presumption against preemption
requiring an affirmative finding of preemption by courts to overcome the
mere fact of state and local regulation, also invites courts to define the range
of regulatory actions leading to antitrust exemptions too broadly. At one
extreme, given the ambiguous approach of Congress in the Sherman Act, no
state or local law would ever be preempted. At the other extreme, Congress
could not have intended to allow passage of the Sherman Act to invalidate a
broad range of state and local regulation at the time, including grain
regulation, sewage regulation, and trolley franchises. For this reason, a
federalism-based approach provides a troubling basis for courts to use in
applying the state-action doctrine.
As Nina Mendelson has emphasized, "the source of the tension between
Chevron and the presumption against preemption is that Congress has failed
to define explicitly whether it believes a statute preempts state law or
whether it wishes an administrative agency to decide that question."'92 In the
context of horizontal-deference issues, deference and the presumption
against preemption pull judicial scrutiny in opposite directions. Where

551, 559 (2001) ("[In most states the ability of a governor to oversee executive branch
policymaking is weak in comparison to the U.S. President.").
191.
Squire, supra note 11, at 99.
192. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 800 (2004).
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Congress makes ambiguous delegations, Mendelson suggests that courts
need to exercise independent judgment to resolve state-law preemption
questions rather than defer to federal agencies at step two of Chevron.193 In
particular, she focuses on how this can further institutional-competence and
political-accountability goals, as well as how this promotes agency expertise,
protects against self-interest, and minimizes the prospect of arbitrary
decisionmaking, raising some
of the concerns that inform the delegation19 4
oriented account of Chevron.
Of course, the state-action exception addresses judicial deference to
state--not federal-regulation. Here, although the presumption against
preemption and deference pull courts in opposite directions, they point in
precisely the same direction-supporting deference to state regulators. State
and local governments, as independent sovereigns whose power is not
derived from Congress, have always retained significant regulatory powers if
they choose to exercise them-as the judicially created category of stateaction doctrine recognizes. For vertical-deference issues, then, blind judicial
adherence to a presumption against preemption would perversely result in
not less, but more, deference to state regulators in the state-action exception
context. Thus, the deference problem that courts face is fundamentally
different from that presented in other federalism contexts involving Chevron.
That is not to say that the lessons of Chevron are irrelevant, but there is
good reason to think that the same approach to issues like federalism simply
is not justified where judicial deference to state, rather than federal,
regulators is at issue. As with other Chevron questions, any institutional
analysis of the deference problem presented by the state-action exception
must focus on the competence of various actors and incentives produced in
the state lawmaking process. Given the well-accepted Madisonian account of
interest-group behavior in state and local politics, 9 1 a court's increased

caution in deferring is in order. If, as Mendelson argues, independent
judicial inquiry is necessary to protect accountability in the context of a
federal agency making a decision to preempt state regulation,1 9 6 an even
greater level of judicial scrutiny will be necessary to protect accountability
where the preemption decision hinges on the policy choice of a state or
local regulator.
Furthermore, courts are not any more inclined to defer to federal
delegations over state agencies. The D.C. Circuit has recognized this basic
principle and the limits of Chevron deference in the context of
telecommunications regulation. The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") adopted a provisional nationwide rule, subject to the possibility of

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 798-800.
See supra note 58.
Mendelson, supra note 192, at 787-91.
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local exceptions in response to a series of reversals on its rules, which
intended to foster a competitive market in local telecommunications.' 07 The
rule relegated to state public-utility commissions the power to determine
when local exceptions to access were warranted, even though Congress had
specifically directed the FCC to consider whether the lack of access would
impair the ability of an entrant to provide service.'" On review, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the FCC's "subdelegation" of determination of an
"impairment" to a state agency. While the court recognized that is was
entirely appropriate for the FCC to delegate to a subordinate within the
agency, it limited subdelegation to outside parties, including state or local
regulators, for fear that "lines of accountability may blur, undermining an
important democratic check on government decision-making. 2 0 0 The court
emphasized that such subdelegation "aggravates
the risk of policy drift
20
inherent in any principal-agent relationship." 1
A second implication of Chevron step-two review of state economic
regulation is that courts review delegations to private entities with an
especially jaundiced eye. The general movement away from traditional
means of regulation and toward deregulation and privatization has
generated much praise for challenging many negative aspects of the
traditional regulatory state. 202 Administrative law has long recognized,
however, that delegations of authority to private entities also present a
unique set of problems-bordering,
at some level, on the
unconstitutional.2 °3 As Paul Verkuil has recently chronicled, privatization
can be pursued without thwarting public values if democratically
accountable public officials preserve certain inherent democratic

197.
In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch.
Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 16983-85 (2003).
198. Id. at 17263, 17272, 17275.
199. U.S. Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
200.
Id. at 565.
201.
Id. at 566. The D.C. Circuit distinguished, and left open the permissibility of,
subdelegations for "(1) establishing a reasonable condition for granting federal approval; (2)
fact gathering; and (3) advice giving." Id.
202. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 343-44 (2005) (describing a "paradigm shift"
away from the top-down, command-and-control approach to regulation and toward a more
reflexive approach to governance, placing private stakeholders at the driver's wheel).
203. The outer limit is best summarized in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936),
which invalidated a delegation to a district board that coal operators elected and unions that
would set wages binding upon all coal producers and noted "[t]his [was] legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form; for it [was] not even delegation to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested." See also Louis L. Jaffe, Lawmaking by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L.
REv. 201, 247-53 (1937) (expressing concerns with private delegations but suggesting that
Carter Coats emphasis on the nondelegation doctrine might be replaced by a focus on dueprocess issues).
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204

functions.
More than two decades ago, Cass Sunstein highlighted these
concerns in the context of step two of the Chevron framework by calling for
more heightened reasonableness review of deregulatory Policies. 2 0 5 As the
issue of private delegations highlights, where private entities solely execute
deregulatory policies and regulators make little or no judgment,20 6 the basis
for an elevated standard of review is strong-if nothing else as a type of
constitutional-avoidance device. As Kenneth Bamberger has recently
observed, extending basic administrative-law principles to private
207
delegations yields significant accountability benefits.
Third, it is a well-recognized tenet of administrative law that if an
agency has failed to provide reasons or has provided inadequate reasons, a
court may not repair the deficiency by providing post hoc rationalizations.
As the Supreme Court stated in SEC v. Chenery Corp.:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court
is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what
it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. 208
Courts may accept post hoc explanations from agencies that "'merely
illuminate reasons obscured but implicit in the administrative record.' 209
However, if the subsequent explanation provides an "entirely new theory" to
support the agency's decision and does not simply provide "additional
background information about the agency's basic rationale," courts will
21°
reject it.
Courts have applied this principle to reject agency
rationalizations provided in briefs but not provided by the agency itself in
making the initial decision subject to appeal. 21 ' Even government litigation

204. Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatizationof Government Functions,84 N.C.
L. REv. 397, 467-69 (2006).
205. Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177
(advocating for a "hard look" approach to judicial review of deregulatory policies). But see
Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REv. 505, 553-61 (1985)
(criticizing "hard look" review of agency decisionmaking, especially in the deregulation
context).
206. For instance, regulators make no judgment where a legislature has delegated the
setting of rates to an industry, as the Court addressed in Ticor. See supra notes 60-64 and

accompanying text.
207. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DuKE L.J. 377, 399-467 (2006).
208. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

209.

Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1507

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

210.

Id.

211.

In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), for example, the Supreme

Court refused to extend Chevron deference to an amicus brief filed by the United States
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positions that the agency advances may be afforded less weight if they only
are provided post hoc on the grounds that Congress did not delegate to
executive agencies the authority to justify agency decisions ex post. 212 This
principle is a foundation of administrative law, frequently serving as a basis
for agency reversal and giving agency officials "strong incentives to attend to
the justifications they provide for their actions." 2t 3 To the extent that this
principle extends to the state-action exception, as I argue it should below,
courts should evaluate reasons ex post by state regulators or reasons
proffered by private litigants with skepticism and afford them no deference;
agency positions presented ex post should be afforded less deference than
agency positions taken concurrent with or prior to a decision.
Finally, the hard-look doctrine, which generally would apply at Chevron's
step two, not only addresses affirmative decisions by regulators, but also
provides an important rationale for extending judicial review to agency
inaction-such as the failure to adopt a rule, to enforce a regulation, to issue
a permit, or to regulate a firm's conduct-as well as affirmative agency
regulatory decisions. As Lisa Bressman has argued, since an agency is
susceptible to corrosive influences when it fails to act, courts can play a
useful role in policing agency inaction. 4 Specifically, courts may review the
failure to enforce pre-articulated regulatory goals under the arbitrary and
capricious doctrine. As Bressman states:
[A]dministrative nonenforcement decisions should be subject to
the familiar requirement that agencies articulate reasons
supporting their affirmative regulatory decisions. In addition,
administrative nonenforcement decisions should be subject to the
important requirement that agencies promulgate and follow
standards guiding their affirmative regulatory authority. Only by
subjecting agency inaction to these principles will courts help
agencies resist the influences that produce arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking, regardless of how those influences are
manifested. zt 5

supporting the interpretation at issue. For further discussion, see Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 150, at 901, noting that the Court's rationale for Chevron "clearly precludes giving Chevron
deference" to interpretations that are "post-hoc rationalizations of agency counsel such as
agency briefs".
212. See Kevin M. Stack, The ConstitutionalFoundationsofChenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 957-58
(2007) (arguing that the Chenery principle-focusing on what the agency has articulated as a
grounds for its actions, not only on what is permissible or rational-is based on constitutional
nondelegation doctrine).
213. Id. at 957.
214. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An ArbitrarinessApproach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (2004).
215. Id.
at 1661.
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just as an agency must provide reasons for taking affirmative regulatory
action, where an agency fails to regulate its inaction should be subject to a
reasons-giving requirement and scrutinized by courts at step two of
Chevron.2 16 Regulatory inaction also can be understood on delegation
terms-an otherwise valid legislative delegation of authority is more likely to
raise private delegation concerns where an agency has authority to regulate
217
but does nothing, so the justification for heightened judicial scrutiny in
this context is strong. Such a principle can play an important role in the
antitrust state-action-exception context, where private firms frequently assert
a state-action defense against the backdrop of inaction by regulators at the
state or local level.
III.

THE LIMITS OF CLEAR STATEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR APPROVING
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT OR SUPPORTING DELEGATIONS

As Frank Easterbrook has suggested, legal presumptions can play an
important role in antitrust law, particularly where they serve as a type of
filter for judicial consideration of antitrust claims.'1 8 If courts approached
the state-action-exception doctrine as providing default rules to guide
judicial intervention, such presumptions could set positive background
incentives in the bargaining process of state lawmaking. The first step of the
Midcal test-the clear-articulation requirement-holds some promise in this
regard. In approaching the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal, courts
might take a lesson from Chevron's analysis, especially its call for modesty in
attributing statutory meaning and its emphasis on clarity as a mechanism for
promoting more democratic decisionmaking. The antitrust state-action
exemption promotes federalism values-values we endorse because they
enhance democratic legitimacy; when properly approached, clear-statement
rules skew decisionmaking toward the political process and away from
judicial resolution. 1 If courts required such statements as a predicate to
extending an antitrust state-action defense, it could increase the likelihood
that a legislature would be explicit about a decision to approve allegedly
anticompetitive conduct or that it would delegate (and articulate on what
terms) approval to a regulatory agency.

216. Bressman discusses two nonjusticiability doctrines in administrative law that can pose a
barrier to such review: nonreviewability doctrine and standing doctrine. As she suggests, neither
is an insurmountable barrier to judicial review of agency inaction. Id. at 1664-75.
217. For a discussion on heightened judicial review as an avoidance mechanism for
addressing the constitutionality of private delegations, see supra notes 202-07 and
accompanying text.
218. Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 39.
219. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (describing how "superstrong clear statement rules" aid courts in focusing legislative attention on constitutional
values).

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 226 2007-2008

ANTITRUST PROCESS AMD VERTICAL DEbERENCE

If a state or local legislative body endorsed a clear ban on competition,
leaving no role for agency regulators (or private firms) in implementing the
ban, there would be little for a federal court to resolve by evaluating the
legitimacy of the ban; this is precisely the sort of state determination that the
Sherman Act intended to leave in place so long as the state made that
determination in a legitimate and transparent manner.2 0° In such an
instance, the legislature would have explicitly approved the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct ex ante by stating its policy of displacing
competition. Assuming such a policy were explicit, clear, and self-executing,
a court should use a clear-statement approach to make a finding that the
state policy gives rise to a state-action exception.
In most instances, however, a legislature will not have expressed a clear
and comprehensive view, but will have delegated some discretion to a
regulatory agency. Assuming that such a delegation were clear in its purpose
to displace competition, the legislature would have met the minimum
requirements for clarity, although there still may be important issues to
assess regarding regulatory oversight. However, it is far more worrisome if a
legislature were ambiguous about its specific purpose in delegating to an
agency and a court purported to find clarity for purposes of satisfying
Midcals first step. As scholars have observed, Chevron's step one invites
judges to engage in the same interpretive mischief. 22' In such cases, rather
than overemphasizing clarity, courts need to carefully address the scope of
the delegation and the extent to which, if at all, the legislature has provided
guidance for the regulatory agency-an exercise that can aid the judicial
inquiry into active supervision.
Just as most courts applying Chevron do not halt their analysis at step
one (determining whether a statute merely delegates the issue to an agency,
aggressively reversing the agency where it does not and blindly deferring to
the agency in any instance in which it does) ,222 the clear-articulation
requirement of Midcal should not merely emphasize whether the legislature
itself has articulated a general policy of displacing competition with clarity.
Given that many state regulatory programs delegate discretion, sometimes
with only a general clear purpose, it is important for courts to define what
questions remain for agency regulators to address under the statute-issues
220. By contrast, if a state or local legislative body adopts a clear statement by expressly
articulating policy to regulate in restraint of trade, as they do in endorsing a monopoly
franchise that is rate-regulated by an agency, the courts may have a very different role to play.
Here, the clear statement is a delegation, and a court still has to evaluate how the agency
exercises that delegation under step two of the Midcal test. See infra Part IV.
221.
See supranote 176 and accompanying text (discussing the Cardoza-Fonsecaapproach to
Chevron step one).
222. As Cass Sunstein has stated, "An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power. Chevron confuses the two." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445 (1989). A legislature can delegate clearly, or can
delegate ambiguously.
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that will need to be assessed at step two of the Midcal test when the agencysupervision role is examined.
Where the state or local legislative intent regarding the relationship
between a state law and the goals of the Sherman Act is at all ambiguous, or
is only general in nature, courts should refuse to attribute clear articulation
of a specific legislative purpose unless there is evidence that this is what a
current majority in the state would endorse. How the legislature articulates a
regulatory program should play an important role in courts' decisions
whether to review the action. "The clear articulation requirement serves an
important purpose," C. Douglas Floyd wrote, "by ensuring that departures
from the presumptive federal competitive norm are authorized only as the
result of a carefully considered, deliberately adopted, and visible state
policy." 223 As William Page has argued in some of the leading articles on

state-action immunity, a clear statement heightens the visibility of legislation,
encouraging participants in the political process to acquire information
about policies and to debate them.224 Absent such a statement, private
conduct that was consistent with or authorized by broad delegations to
municipal governments or regulatory agencies would be subject to review
under the Sherman Act. The key variable in such an analysis should not be
the creation of a majoritarian fiction based on a selective reconstruction of
what a past legislature would have thought. Instead, where there is
ambiguity, courts should focus on clear evidence of what a current majority
would think, since the focus is on encouraging more legitimate democratic
processes today at the state and local level.22 5
Such an approach is hardly foreign to local-government law and its
operation. Although largely superseded by modern "home rule" approaches
to local government, Dillon's rule served the same overall goal of providing
a higher level of supervision for municipal lawmaking. 226 Dillon's rule
invalidated delegations to municipalities absent the state legislature's
223. C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for State-Action
Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. REv. 1059, 1136 (2000). Writing before
Ticor, Floyd argued that clear articulation alone should suffice for purposes of extending stateaction immunity to state-wide sovereign bodies, including both legislatures and agencies. Based

on a Chevron-type analysis of the problem, informed by the political science of interest-group
decisionmaking, I reject this position below, except for in the extreme cases in which nothing at
all is left to others in implementing a state regulatory approach. See infra Parts III, lV.
224. See, e.g.,
William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process:A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1099, 1115-22
(1981); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the
Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE LJ. 618, 640-62.
225.
See, e.g.,
Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2148-54 (defending step-one reversal of an agency
where the agency's position does not represent "any enactable political preference"); Note,
"How Clear is Clear" in Chevron's Step One, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1706 (2005) (describing the
step-one process of predicting the current congressional majority).
226. Clayton P. Gillette, In PartialPraise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public-Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 959, 960-61 (1991).
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express consideration."2 7 This canon of statutory interpretation applied in
many states to invalidate broad state delegations to municipalities, although
most states have moved away from this due to the growth of home rule. The
effect of the clear-articulation requirement, however, is not merely to create
a federally enforced version of Dillon's rule. In contrast to Dillon's rule,
which automatically validated a clear delegation, the clear-articulation
requirement of Midcal would subject private conduct within the scope of the
delegation to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.
Yet, traditional clear-statement rules have their limits as they assume
that a legislature speaks with a single purpose and voice. As Kenneth Shepsle
and many others before and after him have stated, a legislature is a "they,"
not an "it."22' A clear-statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get at

legislative intent-to pay fidelity to past preferences, which are judicially
constructed as a fiction-but a legislature having made a delegation will
rarely have a clear specific intent on an issue of complex economic
regulation. 229 Courts can readily abuse clear-statement rules to the extent
that they use judicially implied clear statements as a backdoor to impose a
constitutional design, allowing 'judicial modesty [to] cloak judicial
activism. , ° Moreover, a clear-statement rule assumes that the major
problem is the legislature, not the interest groups that interact with
lawmaking bodies.
By contrast, a different type of interpretive canon-a preferenceeliciting "penalty default rule"-provides a better way of conceptualizing the
clear-articulation requirement in state-action immunity. Where a court
interpreting a statute is unsure of legislative intent, the court adopts the
interpretation of the statute most unfavorable to the interest group that is
most likely to persuade the legislative body to reverse the judicial
interpretation.2 3' Much as penalty default rules in contract law are designed
232
to elicit better information in future contracting,
such a preferenceeliciting approach encourages a different type of private behavior in future
lawmaking processes. In his work on statutory interpretation, Elhauge
envisions a preference-eliciting approach as influencing private behavior to
procure more explicit legislative action in the future, 233 which will increase
the accountability of the political process. He observes that such an

227.
See Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (describing strict limits on the
authority of municipalities).
228. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 'They, 'Not an 'It" Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).
229. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 219, at 646.
230. Id.
231. Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2257.
232. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 735 (1992).
233. See Elhauge, supra note 172, at 2207.
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approach is especially suitable to statutes that involve exceptions favored by
powerful interest groups, such as tax and antitrust legislation. 2 4
In contexts in which the legislature is clear and specific regarding
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the clear-articulation requirement in the
antitrust state-action exception can serve precisely these purposes.
Understood as a preference-eliciting default rule, however, a cleararticulation requirement should not give rise to automatic state-action
immunity where a legislature is ambiguous and arguably could foresee some
regulatory activity, as has occurred in a variety of past cases. 2 5 The FTC has
observed that courts repeatedly place an emphasis on foreseeability as the
basis for inferring clarity in a legislature's purpose to displace the Sherman
Act: Courts seem to equate a grant of authority or a delegation to an agency
with a clear purpose to displace competition under the Sherman Act. 236 A

penalty default clear-statement rule would afford ambiguity a purpose that
those interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation (i.e., those
with monopoly power in an industry) would disfavor-here, antitrust
enforcement. Interest groups may be successful in persuading state and local
lawmakers to adopt an antitrust exemption for industries, but legislatures
should be expected to use clear and unmistakable language in supplanting
antitrust laws with regulation and especially in making delegations to
implement such regulation to local governments or regulatory agencies.
Beyond clear and unmistakable statutory terms, however, courts must
recognize where discretion-even constrained discretion-remains for state
regulators. 237 Indeed, the risks of judicial overreaching at Midcals step one
are far more significant than overreaching at Chevron's step one, since the
risks involve federal judicial interpretation of state and local legislation.
This increased risk of overreaching has two implications. First, courts
should be reluctant to read detail in state and local statutes as a way of
constraining discretion, although such detail can play an important role in
234. Id. at 2207.
235. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41-43 (1985)).
236. See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (condemning the expansive
interpretation of "clear articulation" by many federal courts).
237. Hence, by arguing for a modest penalty-default-rule approach, this Article does not
endorse a hypertextualist approach to discerning meaning, in which federal courts rely almost
exclusively on dictionaries, rules of grammar, and canons of construction to determine when a
state legislature has clearly articulated a policy of displacing competition. For a discussion of
this analogy in the Chevron context, see generally RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., The Supreme Courts New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 749 (1995). Instead, this Article urges federal courts to draw on the full range of tools
available to them to discern meaning but to exercise caution against implying clarity where
none exists by construing ambiguous statutes against those who stand to immediately benefit
from such clarity and who are in a position to lobby for clarity. In the state-action exception
context, those who stand to benefit will typically be the firms that claim that federal antitrust
laws do not apply to them.
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identifying whether a program of regulatory supervision has standards. 8
Second, any clear statement at Midcals step one should limit its focus on the
extent to which a legislative delegation is explicit in its purposes. To the
extent that courts reduce the antitrust state-action defense to foreseeability
under Hallie, based on implied legislative intent,239 application of the stateaction defense would benefit the interest groups most likely to lobby for
ambiguous delegations. By encouraging firms to lobby for antitrust
exclusion in state legislation and leaving courts to clean up ambiguity
through their aggressive attribution of clarity, state-action immunity can
have harmful forum-shopping effects. For example, a state restructuring
plan that envisioned a scheme of competitive restructuring as displacing
antitrust enforcement could eviscerate the competitive norms of the
antitrust laws, regardless of how such a scheme actually organized the
industry and monitored firm behavior.
Antitrust federalism allows positive regulation by decentralized
governmental bodies, but it does not authorize raw state repeal of federal
antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even through plainlanguage overrides of the Sherman Act that depend on decisions of
regulators.14 0 Thus, to the extent the preference-eliciting default rule
interpretation of state-action immunity eviscerates the active-scrutiny
requirement, it concedes too much. This result is not required by judicial
deference or antitrust federalism, and it may prove harmful to social welfare.
While the parallel to Chevron's step one provides a useful interpretation
of Midcals step one, there is clearly a difference between a statutory gap, as
Chevron addresses, and identifying a- legislative purpose, as Midcal
24 1
emphasizes. Chevron excuses all delegations, both implicit and explicit.

Midcal only excuses explicit delegations. 242 It would be a mistake to end the
judicial inquiry here, as if a clear-statement approach could provide a full
analysis. Of course, clarity at step one can end the inquiry under Chevron, to
the extent an agency renders an interpretation that contravenes clear
statutory language, but identification of a clear legislative purpose, especially
a clear purpose to delegate implementation of clear general goals to
regulators, should not end the inquiry into whether an antitrust state-action
exception exists. Where there is some kind of a delegation, a preferenceeliciting penalty default rule is only the beginning. As I argue below, some

238. As suggested below, such emphasis on detail would more appropriately occur in
evaluating active supervision. See infra Part IV.
239. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing Hallie).
240. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 189, 193 (1994).
241. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(discussing examples of expressed and implied delegations).
242. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110-12 (1980)
(discussing the Court's preference for relying on explicit delegation).
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evaluation of how the state engaged in regulatory oversight under a
legislative delegation is necessary.
IV. MDCAL'S STEP TWO: REASONS FOR FOREGOING ACTIVE SUPERVISION

Step two of Chevron's analysis can also help courts understand the
antitrust state-action defense, especially in the context of state regulatory
inaction. As the Supreme Court stated in Ticor,14 and the Ninth Circuit
embraced in Columbia Steel Casting, active supervision of state regulators'
conduct, as well as a clear statement of purpose, is required to trigger a stateaction defense from antitrust enforcement. 244 However, many appellate
courts remain astonishingly deferential to regulators in applying the activesupervision prong of the Mideal test.2 45 Consistent with the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in the context of municipal regulation,2 46 these appellate
courts effectively read out of antitrust state-action doctrine any serious
scrutiny of regulatory supervision, focusing instead on whether a
decentralized legislative body has delegated authority to supervise private
conduct to an agency. In most cases, potential supervision of conduct alone
has been sufficient to trigger a state-action exemption from enforcement of
the antitrust laws.24 7

This Article argues that the mere potential for agency regulation, as
may be present where a legislature has delegated authority to an agency, is
never sufficient to extend an antitrust state-action exemption. Further,
focusing on past regulatory actions alone in evaluating the state-action
exception can be misleading. A focus on reasons provided by regulators, as
Chevron's 9tep two recommends, would allow courts to develop a more
principled approach to antitrust state-action defense cases-especially where
they are reviewing private conduct that is not subject to regular government
intervention.
A.

THE NECESSITY OFANACTIVE-SUPERVISIONINQUIRY

Some commentators argue that clear articulation of a policy to displace
competition by a state-wide regulator should suffice for purposes of
extending state-action immunity. As C. Douglas Floyd noted, "[S]tate

243. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) (discussing the requirement of
active state supervision to state-action immunity).
244.

Colum. Steel Casting v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1437 & n.8 (9th Cir.

1996) (same).
245. See supra notes 92-143 and accompanying text (citing cases from the Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits).
246. See supra notes 56, 91-113 and accompanying text (describing how active supervision
was not appropriate under this line of cases).
247. For example, the Tenth Circuit found potential regulation by a utility commission
sufficient to trigger a state-action exemption in the Trigen case. See supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
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agencies frequently do possess authority, as a matter of state law, to prescribe
competition policy for the state as a whole under general delegations of
authority from the state legislature."248 Thus, he suggests, "the agency's clear
articulation of state policy within the scope of its delegated" 49authority should
,
suffice in itself to satisfy the clear articulation component.
Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes, private interest groups
frequently face incentives to lobby lawmakers to secure benefits and may
prefer open-ended regulatory schemes that leave details to be worked out by
an agency on a firm-by-firm basis. As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed,
"Regulation by state and local government is not only pervasive, but it is also
probably more susceptible to political influences than federal regulation
is." 250 The more local the lawmaking process, the less costly it is for powerful

interest groups to organize and influence the process, but the process can
have serious spillover effects for non-participants. At the local level, rentseeking may be more visible, but it also may be more stable given the ability
of private firms to exploit the political as well as the regulatory process.
Thus, if courts focused on the quality of the political process leading to
enactment of a market restraint, the now defunct municipal-state distinction
would be sensible. It would require courts to apply more scrutiny to local, as
opposed to state, regulations in restraint of trade.
While Floyd is correct that state and municipal process may demand
different degrees of judicial scrutiny, his recommendation that state
agencies be allowed to opt out of the antitrust law with a clear articulation
alone 251 throws the baby out with the bathwater. Allowing clear-articulation
of a policy to suffice for purposes of bringing private conduct outside of the
scope of the antitrust laws would greatly broaden the scope of the antitrust
state-action doctrine. It would present particularly inviting immunity for
industries in which state legislatures have made broad delegations to
implement regulation to administrative agencies. Moreover, it would
encourage powerful industry-based interest groups to seek broad delegations
with little or no oversight under the antitrust laws.
Rather than allow clear articulation to exempt states from antitrust
enforcement, much as Chevron step one ends the judicial review inquiry for
federal agencies with clear statutory statements, a Chevron analysis informed
by the economics of interest-group decisionmaking illustrates why, under
Midcal, it is always necessary for a court to reach the second step of the test.
At the federal level, where interest-group exploitation of the legislative
process is less likely, it makes sense for courts to end their inquiry with an
248.
249.

Floyd, supra note 223, at 1136.
Id.

250.

Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.

335, 346.
251. Floyd, supra note 223, at 1136 (discussing the varied degrees of deference required at
the federal, state, and municipal levels).
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assessment of the consistency of a federal agency's conduct with clear
statutory language. However, as politics move from the federal context to
the state and municipal levels, the economics of interest-group
decisionmaking make the prospect of strategic use of the lawmaking process
more likely. Firms might use the lawmaking process to extract clear
statements as a strategy to opt out of antitrust enforcement, making it more
likely that the process of such lawmaking will exclude interstate interests that
suffer harm from anticompetitive conduct. For this reason, under Midcal,
unlike Chevron, it will always be necessary for a court to deal with step two of
the inquiry. 252
As Ticor would suggest, 251 it is incumbent on federal courts to take step
two of the Midcal analysis seriously. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the
importance of active supervision in restructured network industries by
applying Midcal in a way that contrasts
markedly with the approaches of the
•• 25425
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. In Columbia Steel Casting,55 the state
of Oregon had clearly expressed a legislative policy to remove market
competition by authorizing regulators to approve allocations of service
territories in the electric-power market.5 However, Midcal and Ticor suggest
that what matters is not only the legislature's clarity in delegating to the
regulator, but also what the regulator does in exercising its discretion.
Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit properly refused to extend an antitrust
state-action defense to a utility's purported anticompetitive conduct in
dividing Portland into exclusive service territories, given that regulators had
not made firm-specific decisions to displace competition with regulation.257
"Mere 'state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in
restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity,"' the Ninth Circuit
251
explained.
If a clear articulation of purpose alone were sufficient to
provide a shield from the Sherman Act, this would create perverse incentives
for interest groups in the state and local lawmaking process. Thus, courts
must examine any delegation to state and local regulators under step two of
Midcal.

252. In this sense, a Chevron-type analysis of the antitrust state-action exception leads me to
a fundamentally different conclusion than Phil Weiser, who advocates higher levels ofjudicial
Chevron deference to state regulators interpreting federal law. See supra note 22.
253. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 92-143 and accompanying text.
255. Colum. Steel Casting Co., Inc. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir.
1996).
256. Id. at 1433 n.2.
257. Id. at 1441-42.
258. Id. at 1440-41 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 736 (9th
Cir. 1981) (other citations omitted)).
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B.

REQUIRING REASONS FOR INACTION

A Chevron analysis also sheds light on what the judicial assessment of
active supervision ideally should entail. Commentators writing on Chevron
recognize that step one typically focuses on an agency's authority, whereas
step two 1assumes
authority but focuses on the reasonableness of the agency
59
decision.
In other words, under Chevron a court only gets to step two if
Congress has not delegated authority to an agency.
The step-two focus on reasonableness is necessary because a court
would seem unduly deferential if it simply deferred to any agency action that
fell within the agency's authority to regulate. In fact, for the same reason
that courts must always arrive at step two of the state-action inquiry, judicial
deference to regulatory authority, without more, invites interest-group
manipulation of the regulatory forum for enforcement of competition law.
The Supreme Court took a particularly egregious misstep in this direction in
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, in which the
Department of Justice accused truckers of horizontal price fixing.26° The
Court rejected that antitrust claim under Midcal on the grounds that state
ratemaking commissions had approved rates that
the truckers had
proposed.
reasoned that mere authority 6to regulate, absent any legislative
• It 26!
requirement
or prearticulated criteria, 262 is sufficient to extend a stateaction exception.
However, even where the legislative delegation at issue may be clear, it
does not follow that the regulator exercised authority in ways that are
consistent with its pre-articulated standards or, if there are none, with the
pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act. Allowing antitrust state-action
doctrine to preclude antitrust enforcement in such circumstances creates
strong incentives for delegation to state regulators with little or no
guarantee that these regulators will exercise such authority in ways that
promote federalism or social welfare, let alone competition. If monopolistic
conduct warrants any scrutiny under antitrust federalism, appellate courts
must depart from their current and past practice of ignoring the activesupervision requirement. Put simply, an opportunity for regulation is not
the same as active supervision-although courts seem to consistently reach
this conclusion. 63
259. See Levin, supra note 184, at 84; Seidenfeld, supra note 163, at 83.
260. S.Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 53 (1985).
261.
Id. at 61 ("[A] state policy that expressly permits, but does not compel, anticompetitive
conduct may be 'clearly articulated' within the meaning of Midcal.").
262. Id. at 64 ("The details of the inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process.., are left
to the agency's discretion. The State Commission has exercised its discretion by actively
encouraging collective ratemaking among common carriers.").
263.

Raising a similar concern, the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force states, "One

recurring problem involves the failure to distinguish between authorizing classes of activity and
forming state policy to displace competition." FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supranote 5, at 26.
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Ticor clarifies that courts must assess how frequently and under what
circumstances regulators exercise their supervisory authority. For example,
the Second Circuit correctly refused to extend an antitrust state-action
exemption to a challenge to an output cartel permitted by New York's
legislation implementing a tobacco settlement 2 64 The legislation was clear
and express in its purpose to implement market-share allocations in
cigarette sales, but the Second Circuit criticized the state for failing 2to
65
articulate either a competitive or anticompetitive rationale for the policy.
Regardless of whether the clear-articulation requirement had been met, and
whether the cartel was foreseeable under Hallie, the Second Circuit refused
to extend a state-action exemption due to a lack of active supervision, as the
second prong of Midcal requires. As the court observed, neither the New
York statutes, the settlement, nor any other regulation envisioned active
supervision of pricing under the cartel. 266 Given no mechanism for reviewing
2 67
the reasonableness of pricing decisions or monitoring market conditions,
the court concluded, "New York has failed to provide for any state
supervision, much less active supervision, of the pricing conduct of cigarette
manufacturers under the anticompetitive market structure."2 ~ It further
observed, "'Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic
assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct
promotes state
' 269
policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests.
Recognizing the important role an active-supervision inquiry plays in
antitrust federalism, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to apply an antitrust
state-action defense on this ground in the context of deregulated electric264. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 222 (2d Cir. 2004).
265. Id. at 229. The court was not convinced by the state's health-benefit claims in the
course of litigation and observed that the only public discussion of the effect of the marketshare provisions was to increase prices and to discourage young people from smoking-the
precise type of cartel that the Sherman Act condemns. Id. at 230. In an order on rehearing, the
court clarified: "[T]he court must find under this [clear-articulation] prong that the state did
not inadvertently include anticompetitive activities in some larger scheme. For this reason, it is
important that a state enunciate its intent to displace competition when it means to do so."
Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
266. Freedom Holdings, 357 F.3d at 230 ("[T]he resolution of the price/sales/public health
conflict is left by the [tobacco settlement agreement] to the [participating manufacturers].").
267.
Id. at 231.
268.
Id. at 232.
269.
Id.
(quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)). An earlier Third Circuit case
reached a similar conclusion, noting that the states "lack oversight or authority over the tobacco
manufacturers' prices and production levels. These decisions are left entirely to private actors."
A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 264 (3d Cir. 2001). However,
that same case extended Noerr-Penningtonimmunity to the settlement, noting that government
settlements are no different in form from other types of legislative lobbying. Id. at 253-54. For
criticism of this approach, see RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETrLEMENT
205-07 (2007). For a popular press account of the significant financial stakes in this antitrust
dispute, see Roger Parloff, Is the $200 Billion Tobacco Deal Going Up in Smoke?, FORTUNE, Mar. 7,
2005, at 126.
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power markets. The court allowed an electrical cooperative to sue an
investor-owned utility for refusing access to essential transmission facilities,
rejecting the utility's claim to an antitrust state-action exemption. 270 The
utility argued that the state regulatory scheme clearly envisioned that the
utility would have the ability to refuse to wheel power to the extent the state
had adopted a clear policy to displace competition among electric suppliers,
but the Ninth Circuit did not allow this to trigger an antitrust defense.2 7'
Under Idaho law, the utility could decline the customer's wheeling request
without the substantive review of a state agency or state courts, but the court
reasoned that "[t]his is the type of private regulatory power that the activesupervision prong of Midcal is supposed to prevent. "2 72 Thus, the Ninth

Circuit reasoned that a self-policing regulatory scheme may not require
active supervision to qualify for an antitrust state-action exemption, 273 but
where the regulator has discretion to exercise active supervision, there is an
appropriate inquiry for a court. Similarly, perhaps signaling a departure
from the deferential approach it previously had embraced in the electricpower context, 2 74 the Tenth Circuit refused to extend an antitrust state-

action defense to Southwestern Bell's lock-up telephone contracts, which
were "neither mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known
about" by state regulators. 27 5
Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active-supervision threshold
can create, some lower courts have recognized that active supervision "would
be satisfied if the state or state agencies held ratemaking hearings on a
consistent basis. " 2 76 Such an inference would be a good starting point for a
judicial analysis of the application of antitrust laws in a restructured network
environment. Courts have a long history of allowing the existence of
consistent ratemaking hearings at the state or local level to give rise to an
antitrust state-action exemption. 77 In Ticor, for instance, the Supreme Court
found it relevant that the Wisconsin state regulatory body had not held rate
hearings prior to approving a jointly filed insurance rate. 278 Thus, extending
a presumption of an antitrust state-action exemption and against judicial
intervention in the context of rate hearings is appropriate.

270. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacificorp, 238 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001).
271.
Id. at 1194.
272. Id.
273. Id. (citing Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1987) and FTC v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992)).
274.
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
275. Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002).
276.
See Green v. People's Energy Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cases
73,999 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(finding active supervision where the agency held lengthy hearings on a gas supplier's rates on
a consistent basis).
277.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 629-31 (noting the relevance of rate hearings).
278. Id.

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 237 2007-2008

93 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2007]

Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this standard. For
example, the antitrust state-action defense does not protect a contract
provision prohibiting a customer from entering into the electricity market as
a competitor in the future that a utility offers in exchange for a discounted
rate. 279 For similar reasons, mere private filings of contracts or tariffs with a
regulatory agency, without active regulatory scrutiny or oversight, would not
meet the active-supervision requirement under a process-based account.
Without meaningful agency review of the specific private conduct at issue,
private firms
can abuse the antitrust state-action defense in a deregulatory
•280
environment. The factors that should guide courts include how frequently
agencies monitor private activities, whether agencies have authority to
enforce standards through the imposition of penalties, and whether
agencies have adequate resources to engage in meaningful monitoring and
enforcement. When in doubt, if a regulatory system risks the imposition of
spillover effects on non-participants, the presumption should be against
invoking an antitrust state-action defense.
Courts must be true to the overall federalism purposes of the antitrust
state-action exemption in interpreting the active-supervision requirement.
Fidelity to federalism would not only limit assessment of supervision to state
regulation, but also would include other regulatory bodies, such as
municipalities. In addition, fidelity to federalism would require some
attention to the process that gives rise to regulatory supervision. If the
purposes of regulatory action overlap with the overall consumer-welfare
goals of the Sherman Act, perhaps some degree of deference to supervision
by the state or local regulator is appropriate. However, intervention of the
antitrust laws is entirely appropriate if the purpose is blatantly protectionist
in ways that do not even arguably improve consumer welfare and that
impose spillover costs on those in other jurisdictions who have not
participated in the process leading to the adoption of regulation. A
preference-eliciting default rule would align private incentives to ensure
more explicit procurement of state-action immunity via legislation and
regulatory activity.
In contrast to the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth
Circuit correctly requires an affirmative finding of active supervision by the
regulator as a predicate to any finding of an antitrust state-action exemption,

279.
280.

United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
As the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force observes:
Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct,
pursuant to that [clearly articulated] regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports
with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be
deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly be
placed with the state.

FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 54.
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even in deregulated markets. However, a more recent Ninth Circuit case
addressing the antitrust state-action defense in the very same antitrust claim
illustrates how readily courts will undermine the active-supervision prong if
they allow it to hinge entirely on the nature of the regulatory program
approved by a state legislature rather than on what regulators do in
implementing that program. On the heels of the court's recognition that
there was no state-action defense in the first Snake River Valley Electric Ass'n v.
PacifiCorp,"81 the Ninth Circuit extended state-action immunity to the same
allegedly anticompetitive conduct.282 Following the first judicial finding of
no state action, which allowed antitrust litigation to go forward, the Idaho
83
legislature intervened by amending its Electric Supplier Stabilization Act.
The amendments allowed an electric supplier to refuse to wheel power if the
requested wheeling "results in retail wheeling and/or a sham wholesale
transaction," subject to review of the state regulatory agency. In addition,
the Idaho legislature prohibited competing suppliers from serving
customers or former customers of other electric suppliers unless the
competing supplier petitioned the Idaho regulator and the regulator issued
an order allowing the service. 285
In addressing this legislative intervention, the Ninth Circuit held that,
unlike the previous statutory arrangement, which left the decision not to
wheel entirely to private choice, the amended statute "has not left
unregulated a private preserve without competition." 286 Thus, the statute
met the active-supervision requirement for extending an antitrust stateaction exemption. 28 7 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Idaho statute
precluded a private utility from wheeling without a contrary decision by the
state regulator.288 As a result, statutes and regulations that prohibit
competition can eviscerate any active-supervision requirement. 9Under this
approach, a private firm that is successful in lobbying for a statute that
prohibits it from engaging in competitive conduct would be immune from
antitrust challenge-even if that legislation occurs in the context of a
pending antitrust challenge.
Recently, the FTC State Action Report elaborated on the benefits of a
process-based approach to assessing state active supervision in the stateaction context, as requiring (1) "the development of an adequate factual

281.
282.

See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp., 357 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004).

283.

Id,

284.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-332D(1) (2002).

285.
286.
287.

Id. § 61-334B.
Snake River Vally Elec. Ass'n, 357 F.3d at 1049.
Id.

288.

Id. at 1048-49.

289. The Eleventh Circuit allowed this in the
and accompanying text.

EC Cogenerationcase. See supra notes 109-13
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record, including notice and an opportunity to be heard"; (2) "a written
decision on the merits"; and (3) "a specific assessment-both qualitative and
quantitative-of how private action comports with the substantive standards
established by the state legislature."290 While the FTC did not explicitly
reference administrative-law principles, the connection seems obvious and is
worthy of attention by antitrust scholars, litigators, and decisionmakers.
Paying attention to agency actions and history is a start to an activesupervision inquiry, but a Chevron step-two-type inquiry in antitrust stateaction analysis might give meaningful content to the process-based approach
urged in the recent FTC State Action Report. Instead of focusing on actions,
the Chevron step two focuses on process and reasons. In the antitrust context,
it would seem that antitrust enforcement should proceed if a state or local
agency failed to provide basic standards for evaluating inaction. Courts
might create an exception where the actions of the regulator illustrated the
regulator's capacity and willingness to supervise markets. These actions
might include a history of regulatory intervention in setting rates or
regulating industry structure, assuming this approach remains in effect.
However, absent reasons given ex ante by state or local officials, within the
scope of the regulators' discretion, courts generally should proceed to apply
antitrust law to the private conduct at issue. Where state or local officials
provide reasons for inaction that are in tension with the goals of federal
antitrust laws, courts should require those reasons to be given ex ante in the
state regulatory forum, where they will be subject to judicial review. Further,
for purposes of extending an antitrust state-action defense, a court should
require those reasons to be consistent with the regulatory framework and to
meet minimal reasonableness standards.
For example, consider state and local bans on competition. While these
bans exist in a variety of industries, they are most visible in industries such as
electric power, where competition exists in the deregulated wholesale
market but retail markets are left to the discretion of state regulators. Many
states have banned retail electric-power competition outright, allowing
incumbent electric utilities, regulated under traditional cost-of-service
principles, to provide service without the competitive threat of new
entrants. 291 To date, such bans on retail competition have avoided antitrust
292
challenge under the Sherman Act given the state-action exception.

290.

FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supranote 5, at 55.

291. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has identified several ways in which state
regulators have failed to conform to wholesale markets, represented at the extreme by states
that have banned retail competition to favor traditional rate regulation. FED. TRADE COMM'N,
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY
REFORM: Focus ON RETAIL COMPETITION 13-32 (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/

reports/elec/electricityreport.pdf.
See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
292.
opinion in TEC Cogeneration).
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However, casting the antitrust state-action exception as focusing on
delegation issues suggests that, while state and local governments have
considerable leeway to ban competition in various industries, competition
bans are not prima facie valid. Under a delegation approach, the
significance of competition bans will depend on who--a legislature or a
regulatory agency-makes the basic decision to ban competition. A state
legislature can, as a sovereign body, make that decision without providing
reasons, assuming that whatever ban it enacts is self-executing and not
contingent on decisions delegated to governmental agencies or private
parties. 29 3 At the same time, if a state-enacted competition ban were
intended to undermine national markets, extending a state-action exception
to antitrust enforcement would be inappropriate under the Supremacy
Clause. For example, state bans on competition may pose a conflict with
national regulatory approaches (such as the deregulated wholesale
market) .94 To the extent this is so, if state regulators have failed to address
this conflict or to pursue legitimate state regulatory objectives, federal courts
should be wary of a private firm's invocation of an antitrust state-action
defense even by the state legislature.
At the same time, a delegation approach recognizes that there must be
some outer limit on legislative decisions to ban competition. For example, if
a legislative decision to ban competition also authorized collusive behavior
among private actors, private delegation concerns would arise and judges
would exercise scrutiny when analyzing the legislation.295 Where a
293. As I have argued elsewhere, the dormant Commerce Clause can serve as the outer
limit for such exercises of legislative power, such as where a state legislature imposes spillover
costs on those who do not have the opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process. SeeJim
Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 521 (2005) (discussing the importance of the political process in analyzing
antitrust legislation). There I also argue that courts examine spillover effects of regulation and
legislation in assessing whether to extend the state-action exception by focusing on the
lawmaking process. Id. at 567-68. My proposal there is similar to Squire's focus on the fairness
of process as a basis for scrutinizing state regulations that set prices, see supra note 146, but this
Article's emphasis on the delegation issues presented in state and local regulatory processes
clearly advises in favor of more aggressive judicial scrutiny in other regulatory contexts than his
proposal would endorse.
294. The Federal Trade Commission has identified several ways in which the failure of state
regulators to conform to wholesale markets, represented at the extreme by states that have
banned retail competition to favor traditional rate regulation, limits the benefits of competition
from wholesale electric-power restructuring. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 291, at 13-21. For
example, state restrictions on power-plant and transmission-line siting have limited the benefits
from regional wholesale-power markets. Id. at 22-28. State standard-offer service programs have
impaired new entrants and limited the benefits of wholesale competition for retail customers,
especially smaller residential customers. Id. at 43-51. Stranded cost recovery allowed by state
regulators has also allowed traditional state monopolists to preserve their grip over consumer
welfare while they simultaneously benefit from wholesale competition. Id. at 51-55.
295. As Herbert Hovenkamp observes, "the state could not simply pass a statute authorizing
building contractors to fix prices and then leave them free to do so entirely on their own."
HOVENKAMP, supra note 72, at 233.
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competition ban operated within the context of a governmental delegation,
as did Idaho's ban (which allowed state regulators to exercise discretion to
grant exceptions), 296 the state's decision to ban competition would warrant
careful scrutiny. It would seem that the most democratically elected officials
within a state government, such as a state legislature or governor, should
have the authority to ban state or local competition without providing
elaborate reasons ex ante. Yet, where there is less majoritarian accountability
(as may exist when state or local agency regulators give reasons), there is
also much more to be gained from a judicially imposed reason-giving
requirement. At a minimum, a state regulatory agency should be expected
to articulate such reasons-either ex ante (before adopting a competitive
ban) or post hoc (such as in an amicus brief)-as a condition to a court
approving the extension of an antitrust state-action exception.
Disclosure and monitoring programs present perhaps one of the most
challenging new issues in applications of the state-action exception. Just as
disclosure and monitoring programs are increasingly popular at the federal
level, many state and local regulators have experimented with the same
approach in traditional and new regulatory scenarios. 291 For example, states
frequendy require energy suppliers in deregulated electric-power markets to
file reports with regulators regarding their market activities. If a state

296. See supranote 42 and accompanying text (describing how Colorado's failure to have a
"state-wide policy" made the City of Boulder's ban "subject to antitrust challenge").
297. In addition to states that continue to require reporting for traditional electric utilities
using market-based rates, disclosure requirements for suppliers range from reporting
information to regulators about pricing, generation, distribution, and transmission, to labeling
laws that require the disclosure of fuel content. Many states also require registration and
reporting for intermediate market actors, including aggregators, marketers, and brokers. For
example, the Virginia registration summary and a summary of many of these licensing
requirements can be found online. See Virginia Energy Choice, Virginia Utility Regulation,
available at http://www.vaenergychoice.org/suppliers/suppliers.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007);
see also RICHARD P. SEDANO, CONSUMER INFORMATION SERIES, ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A
STATUS REPORT (2002), availableat http://ww.distributed-generation.com/licensing.htm. For a
more complete description of such requirements, see generally RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L
COUNCIL ON COMPETITION & THE ELEC. INDUS., ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A STATUS

REPORT (2002), available at http://www.ncouncil.org/pdfs/disclosure-final.pdf. This is a major

shift in the role of state regulators in this industry, from traditional rate hearings to information
gathering, monitoring, investigation, and, at the extreme, whistleblowing or enforcement.
These examples from state electric-power regulation are a small part of a larger emphasis on
disclosure as a regulatory approach in this and other industries. See Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
CollaborativeGovernance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 589, 610
(2005) (emphasizing the need for state regulators to transform themselves from traditional
price regulators to "investigative/disclosure" vehicles and "ultimate monitors/whistleblowers");
Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.Org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit
Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 239-40 (2004) (describing state attorney-general
registration and disclosure programs for nonprofit solicitation); see also Donald F. Santa, Jr.,
Who Needs What, and Why? Reporting and Disclosure Requirements in Emerging Competitive Electricity
Markets, 21 ENERGY LJ. 1, 1 (2000) (describing a new class of disclosure requirements at the
federal and state levels).
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requires the disclosure of information for purposes of market monitoring,
the fundamental question in deciding whether to extend state-action
immunity hinges on the standards that state officials apply in monitoring
and enforcing regulations against firms that have disclosed information to
regulators. For example, a group of private firms might disclose their
participation in joint ratemaking activities. If the regulator did not act to
prohibit the practice, the firms could claim antitrust immunity.
At its core, this type of problem challenges courts to examine state and
local regulatory inaction to decide if it is consistent with broader antitrust
goals-paralleling calls that federal courts review agency inaction for
arbitrariness at step two of Chevron.298 To the extent that a regulator's
disclosure-and-monitoring standards are consistent with competition (i.e.,
pro-market, as is frequently the case with state plans designed to enhance
competition), a federal court can review them for overlap with federal
antitrust enforcement and should only extend a state-action defense to the
extent it is co-extensive with the goals of the Sherman Act. On the other
hand, if a disclose-and-monitor program is inconsistent in its approach with
the competitive goals of the Sherman Act, the fundamental inquiry should
focus on whether a state or local agency gives reasons for failing to enforce
that are consistent with its pre-articulated criteria to either displace or
regulate competition. If a state has no pre-articulated criteria, or if those
criteria are only expressed ex post, a federal court should refuse to extend
the state-action exception.
CONCLUSION

In terms of remedy, under the process-based account advanced in this
Article, a failure to apply the antitrust state-action exception has less
significant consequences than other judicial review of legislation or
regulation. It does not result in condemning public conduct or necessarily
striking state or local legislation. It also does not require anything specific of
state officials, other than to provide reasons in cases where state regulators
wish to allow firms to escape antitrust scrutiny. 99 Nor does it result in

298. See Bressman, supra note 181, at 503 (explaining that "courts ought to refuse to accord
Chevron deference to any administrative interpretation that does not reflect a federal
directive").
299. The Tenth Amendment does not pose a barrier to a process-based account of the

antitrust state-action exception, given that no state or local regulatory action is compelled and
that it promotes democracy at the state and local level. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 93335 (1997), establishes that Congress or federal regulators cannot commandeer state officials by
requiring them to act. Under the delegation account of the state-action exception presented in

this Article, state officials may still choose not to articulate reasons and may refuse to file briefs
in federal antitrust cases. Even if they do so, the state or local regulatory program still would

survive under both federal and state law to the extent it is consistent with federal antitrust law.
However, if courts adopted the approach that this Article proposes, the silence or inaction of
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vacation or reversal and remand, as typically occurs when a court reverses an
agency decision under Chevron.00 Instead, a failure to extend the state-action
exception merely subjects private conduct to judicial evaluation under the
antitrust laws. Such an approach preserves federalism values by protecting
the type of democratic participation that forms the core of federalism. It also
reduces the incentive for private interest groups to quietly lobby state and
local regulators in ways that allow the state-action doctrine to become a
forum-shopping
strategy for private firms to opt out of antitrust
30
enforcement. '
While accountability-driven, this proposal is not intended to interpret
the Sherman Act as a free-roaming invitation to federal judges to impose
their own political accountability ideals onto state and local governments.
First and foremost, antitrust laws are about competition and efficiency in
private markets. Often, however, industries face a mix of private and public
ordering: the state-action exception defines that mix where state or local
regulation is at issue. Nothing in the history of the Sherman Act indicates
that political accountability was its primary goal, but if the judicially
fashioned state-action exception fails to heed accountability, this could come
at the cost of the explicit goals of competition law.
While state or local governments have the choice to embrace monopoly
over competition, Congress could not have intended to encourage private
firms that wish to avoid federal antitrust scrutiny to hide behind the veil of
state or local government approval without some transparency and
accountability for public decisions; after all, this would allow state and local
governments to facilitate antitrust violations with no scrutiny at all.
In
addition, paying attention to political accountability advances at least one
articulation of the primary goals of the antitrust laws: that Congress sought
to protect competition by smaller firms for purposes of ensuring that large
firms with monopoly power do not dominate the political process, especially
at the state and local level where powerful firms are more likely to thwart
lawmaking that maps majoritarian preferences. In this sense, market
competition may have been designed to encourage not just any private
arrangement but to encourage
those that are most consistent with increased
3°s
accountability.
political

state or local officials clearly would have consequences for private firms invoking the regulatory
program as a basis for a state-action exception from antitrust enforcement.
300. See supra notes 153, 173-213 and accompanying text (describing Chevron step-two).
301.
See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (arguing that the state-action doctrine
has forum-shopping effects).
302. This implication of broad state-action immunity is discussed supraat Part I.
303. See Elhauge, supra note 13, at 682-96 (proposing a process-based interpretation of
antitrust law); Pitofsky, supra note 73, at 1053-58 (urging a populist interpretation of the
Sherman Act for political-legitimacy reasons).
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Even if the more ambitious proposal of viewing the defense entirely
through a process lens is not endorsed, this Article advances the case for
requiring attention to procedure as an evidentiary predicate to making a
Casting
decision to extend the state-action exception on other grounds.
for
reasons
requiring
deference
vertical
type
of
state-action issues as a
to
reconcile
courts
way
for
federal
inaction by state regulators provides a
competition policy with state regulation without sacrificing political
accountability at the state and local level or undermining the goals of
antitrust law. If courts addressing state-action-exception issues were to draw
on the process-based principles that inform Chevron and its application,
antitrust law would be much better equipped to deal with the issues
presented by inaction in state and local regulation, particularly as
legislatures and courts restructure industries such as insurance, health care,
energy, and telecommunications to enhance competition.

304. For example, hard-look review serves the signaling function of state or local regulation
that could help courts evaluate whether a state sovereign sees the benefits of a regulatory
program as justifying the costs. See Stephenson, supra note 183, at 755. Such an approach would
aid courts in making decisions under Squire's preemption approach. See supra note 146
(describing how Squire incorporates process considerations into his substantive-preemption
analysis).
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